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ABSTRACT
From its establishment in 1602, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was an extensive and
powerful trading company that sought to gain a monopoly over the spice trade in Southeast Asia,
often using coercion to do so. In 1619 the VOC established its central base of operations in
Batavia on the Indonesian island of Java. From the start, the VOC pursued a relationship of
cooperation with the Chinese merchants in Batavia, which eschewed the use of violence in favor
of other means of control, such as taxation and requirements to register with the authorities. For
one hundred and twenty-one years, the VOC opted to treat the Chinese community as useful
conduits who offered the Dutch important access to labor and trading opportunities. The
massacre of the Chinese residents in Dutch Batavia in 1740 overturned this century-long
established approach to ruling the Chinese community. Unlike scholars who have argued that the
massacre was part of a wider pattern of colonial violence, this thesis will argue that the 1740
massacre was an anomaly for the Dutch governance of the Chinese merchants in Batavia.
Analyzing the longer time frame before the massacre distinguishes this thesis from those that
also see it as an anomaly. By examining official VOC records, letters between VOC officials,
and the memoirs of several admirals, it is quite evident that various conditions, such as an influx
of poor Chinese laborers into Batavia’s surrounding area, an economic depression, and
corruption among Chinese and Dutch officials, generated the 1740 massacre. The massacre was
not an accepted policy of the VOC since the Governor in charge was arrested. Even when war
broke out throughout Java after the massacre, some remnants of earlier cooperation between the
VOC and the Batavian Chinese were still evident.

KEYWORDS: Dutch East India Company, Batavia, Indonesia, Chinese merchants, massacre,
cooperation
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

“Dead bodies blocked the doors; their blood flowed into the ditches and canals,” 1
recorded an anonymous eyewitness to the massacre of Chinese residents in Dutch Batavia in
1740. The use of violence by the Dutch against their colonial subjects in Southeast Asia was
hardly unusual, and some scholars have argued that this murderous event is best understood as
part of a broader Dutch colonial policy,2 which used violence to subdue local indigenous groups
in what is today modern Indonesia. However, this thesis will argue that the massacre of 1740 was
an anomaly rather than an integral part of a wider campaign of coercion. From their arrival in the
early seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company (VOC)3 had found cooperation with
Chinese merchants beneficial, even essential, for their trading operations in East Asia, and the
treatment of Chinese inhabitants in the colony of Batavia reflected this dynamic. Through
taxation and requirements to register with the authorities, the Dutch asserted their control over
the Chinese community but used a light hand that privileged cooperation over coercion. The
massacre of 1740 overturned this long established approach to governing the Chinese
community. The city walls of Batavia that had long protected the Chinese merchants suddenly
trapped them. Neighbors killed their neighbors. Even children and women were murdered inside
the once protective walls. Ten thousand Chinese inhabitants were slaughtered within a few days.
While the brutality of this horrific massacre is not in doubt, its place in Dutch governance was

1

Leonard Blussé and Nie Dening, trans. and eds., The Chinese Annals of Batavia, the Kai Ba Lidai Shiji and Other
Stories (1610-1795) (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2018), 128.
2
Hans Derks, “The Chinese, The VOC, and the Opium,” in History of the Opium Problem (Leiden: Brill, 2012),
258, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv4cbhdf.20; A.R.T. Kemasang, “The 1740 massacre of Chinese in
Java: Curtain raiser for the Dutch plantation economy,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 14, no. 1 (1982): 67,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1982.10412638; Willem Remmelink, The Chinese War and the Collapse of the
Javanese State, 1725-1743 (Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde Press, 1994), 128.
3
VOC is the abbreviation of the Dutch name of the company: Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie.
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unique and ran counter to long standing policy. The Company’s arrest of the Governor in charge
during the massacre reiterates the fact that the Company did not support this violent policy. This
thesis will examine the place of Chinese merchants in Dutch trading networks and the reasons
why the massacre of 1740 occurred despite the interests of the Dutch in maintaining these
trading arrangements.
Various historians contribute to the large and vibrant historiography on the Dutch East
India Company. Books by historians such as Stephen Bown, Adam Clulow, and Tristan Mostert
are particularly strong in terms of comparative history of joint stock companies in the
seventeenth century.4 The historical context during the time of the trading companies is very
important to this thesis. Bown’s book provides a general comparison between the English and
Dutch trading companies, while Clulow and Mostert provide an edited collection of sources
exploring the uses of diplomacy and violence by the trading companies. In contrast, Robert
Parthesius provides a detailed account of the Dutch shipping industry.5 He analyzed various
databases to construct a thorough account of the trading areas in Asia and the various shipping
regions. He also examines competition between various shipping companies in the region. These
books engage with critical questions of the mechanics of trading company operations and their
use of violence in a mix of other policies. Collectively, they provide the basic background
needed to understand the powerful Dutch East India trading company within the competitive
milieu of seventeenth and eighteenth century Indonesia.

4

See Stephen R. Bown, Merchant Kings: When Companies Ruled the World, 1600-1900 (New York, NY: St.
Martin’s Press, 2009); Adam Clulow and Tristan Mostert, eds., The Dutch and English East India Companies:
Diplomacy, Trade and Violence in Early Modern Asia (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018).
5
See Robert Parthesius, Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters: The Development of the Dutch East India Company (VOC)
Shipping Network in Asia 1595-1660 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010).

2

Recent work in the broader field of colonial history also contributes to our understanding
of the Dutch East India Company’s place in European imperial endeavors in the Indian Ocean
and beyond.6 The study of colonialism and imperialism contributes to the study of the Chinese
Massacre in Batavia because it provides a fundamental background to the behaviors of colonial
powers. The sources on imperial efforts demonstrate the long-standing use of coercion and
violence by Europeans to gain control over territory and trade. This context of violence provides
an important historical element to the study of Batavia because it shows how the Dutch treatment
of Chinese merchants in Batavia was unusual, if not unprecedented.
Chinese trading networks also receive significant scholarly attention.7 Several scholars
write about the substantial Chinese trading community in the Philippines and the periodic
Spanish massacres of this community.8 These studies offer revealing comparisons to the
relationship between the Dutch and Chinese inhabitants in Batavia. However, there is less
scholarly attention on the positive impact of Chinese merchants on various islands throughout
Southeast Asia. Chinese merchants established an extensive trading network that became
lucrative to the Europeans and indigenous partners all over the region. The field can still benefit
from a more detailed analysis of the collaboration between the Europeans and the overseas
Chinese merchants. This thesis hopes to contribute to these neglected themes.

6

See Roger Crowley, Conquerors: How Portugal Forged the First Global Empire (London: Faber & Faber, 2015);
C.R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800 (London: Penguin Group, 1965).
7
See Anthony Reid, “Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia,” in Sojourners
and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese, ed. Anthony Reid, 15-50 (Honolulu: HI: University of
Hawai’i Press, 2001); Leonard Blussé, “Chinese Trade to Batavia during the days of the V.O.C.,” Archipel 18
(1979): 195-213, https://www.persee.fr/doc/arch_0044-8613_1979_num_18_1_1509.
8
See Jose Eugenio Borao, “The Massacre of 1603: Chinese Perception of the Spanish in the Philippines,” Itinerario
22, issue 1 (1998): 22-40, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0165115300012407; Lucille Chia, “The Butcher, the Baker, and
the Carpenter: Chinese Sojourners in the Spanish Philippines and Their Impact on Southern Fujian (SixteenthEighteenth Centuries),” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 49, no. 4 (2006): 509-534,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/25165171.
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Scholars examine the massacre of 1740 from a variety of perspectives. Some focus on the
very complex political and social situation on Java before the massacre, examining the tensions
between the indigenous communities, the Chinese, and the Dutch members of the VOC.
Historians such as Susan Abeyasekere and Ann Kumar write detailed accounts of the history of
Java and the impact of Europeans on the area.9 Abeyasekere’s concise description of the
establishment of Batavia and her analysis of primary sources such as letters from General Coen
to the Heeren XVII make considerable contributions to the field. Kumar’s work is strongest
when it deals with the VOC’s political and economic effects on the societies of Java. However,
neither Abeyasekere nor Kumar focus specifically on the peaceful relationship and economic
arrangements between the Dutch, Chinese merchants, and Javanese inhabitants. This thesis adds
to this field of study by analyzing further the evolving relationships between the various
inhabitants of Java before and after the massacre of 1740.
M.C. Ricklefs, the leading historian on modern Indonesia, brilliantly outlines the
complex social structures of the inhabitants of the various Indonesian islands including Java. His
descriptions of the various Javanese kingdoms and royal courts provide a relevant and vital
background about the island’s complex society. In his article entitled, “The Crisis of 1740-1 In
Java: The Javanese, Chinese, Madurese and Dutch, and the fall of the court of Kartasura,”
Ricklefs concisely analyzes the Chinese Massacre of 1740 in the context of the troubles present
on Java. He demonstrates that the massacre of the Chinese occurred during a time of upheaval
between the various people groups on the island. He also explains that the massacre of 1740 was
followed by a time of warfare between three ethnic groups that encompassed the whole island.

9

See Susan Abeyasekere, Jakarta: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Ann Kumar, Java and
Modern Europe: Ambiguous Encounters (London: Curzon Press, 1997).
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Ricklefs offers the most important study to date of Java in the time leading up to the massacre.
His focus on the complex interaction of local groups provides a critical context for this study,
which focuses on the Dutch and Chinese outsider communities on Java.
While Ricklefs’ study differs from other historians because he analyzes the complex
impact of the massacre on local indigenous groups, several other historians examine the
relationship of the Chinese and Dutch from alternative perspectives. In his doctoral thesis,
Johannes Vermeulen offers the most thorough account of the troubles between the Chinese
merchants and the Dutch of Batavia before the massacre.10 He also concisely explains the horrors
of the mass killings, focusing most of his attention on who was responsible for the massacre and
the consequences of the deadly event. Other historians touch on the massacre in scholarly
articles.11 Mary Somers Heidhues describes the event from the perspective of German
eyewitnesses, while Claudine Salmon provides a brief account of the revolts before the massacre
and the violence that followed.
The leading historians of the massacre Leonard Blussé and A.R.T. Kemasang represent
the two contrasting schools of thought. Blussé, who specializes in Asian-European relations,
specifically analyzes the relationship between the Dutch working for the VOC and the Chinese
merchants who inhabited Batavia.12 Blussé stresses the collaboration that existed between the
Dutch, Chinese merchants, and the indigenous peoples of the islands for many decades following

10

See Johannes Theodorus Vermeulen, “De Chineezen te Batavia en de Troebelen van 1740” (PhD diss., University
of Leiden, 1938).
11
See Mary Somers Heidhues, “1740 and the Chinese Massacre in Batavia: Some German Eyewitness Accounts,”
Archipel 77, no. 1 (2009): 117-147, http://www.persee.fr/doc/arch_0044-8613_2009_num_77_1_4127; Claudine
Salmon, “The Massacre of 1740 as Reflected in a Contemporary Chinese Narrative,” Archipel 77 (2016): 149-154,
https://www.persee.fr/doc/arch_0044-8613_2009_num_77_1_4128.
12
See Leonard Blussé, “Batavia, 1619-1740: The Rise and Fall of a Chinese Colonial Town,” Journal of Southeast
Asian Studies 12, no. 1 (1981): 159-178, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20070419; Leonard Blussé, Strange Company:
Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1988); Blussé,
“Chinese Trade to Batavia during the days of the V.O.C.,” 195-213.

5

the VOC takeover of the region; and how, despite this long period of harmonious relations, the
deterioration of the trust between ethnic groups---and particularly the Dutch and Chinese---was
an important factor in the massacre.13 The thesis argued in this paper builds off of this research.
The arguments of A.R.T. Kemasang, the leading Indonesian scholar who specifically
analyzes the role of the overseas Chinese in Java, run counter to those of Blussé.14 Kemasang’s
main argument in his numerous writings that touch on the massacre is that the Chinese
merchants were an economic threat to the Dutch Company. Kemasang contends that the Dutch
had much to gain economically from exterminating the Chinese. He argues that the Dutch were
hostile to the Chinese from the beginning; hence, the Dutch believed the Chinese were
expendable. He compares this massacre to the mass killings that occurred in 1621 on the Banda
islands, which were also part of the Dutch East Indies. Additionally, Kemasang contends that the
Dutch declared an “open season” on the Chinese in Java throughout the eighteenth century.15
While Kemasang makes many significant contributions to the scholarship in the field, this thesis
will argue that his argument is greatly weakened by his lack of acknowledgement of the
cooperation between the Chinese and VOC before the massacre and the fact that he takes some
of the events out of context.
The Dutch East India Company was established during a time when the use of force was
an accepted means for gaining and maintaining control over trade, and it regularly used coercion
to break into and then monopolize the spice trade in Southeast Asia. The Company’s main goal

13

Blussé, “Batavia, 1619-1740,” 160.
See A.R.T. Kemasang, “How Dutch Colonialism Foreclosed a Domestic Bourgeoisie in Java: The 1740 Chinese
Massacres Reappraised,” Review 9, no. 1 (1985): 57-80, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40241012; A.R.T. Kemasang,
“Overseas Chinese in Java and Their Liquidation in 1740,” Southeast Asian Studies 19, no. 2 (1981): 123-146,
http://hdl.handle.net/2433/56053.
15
Kemasang, “The 1740 massacre of Chinese in Java,” 67-68.
14
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was to eliminate European competition. As the massacre in the Banda islands in 1621
demonstrates, indigenous peoples were often killed in the fight for European domination. In this
context of violent competition, the relationship between the Dutch and the Chinese merchants in
Batavia was quite different. The Dutch identified the importance of the Chinese merchants in
their overseas trading network. Hence, they strove to have a mutually beneficial relationship with
these Chinese merchants in Batavia. For over a century, the Dutch did not use violent force to
control or intimidate the Chinese inhabitants. In an environment and era where violence was
frequently used against European rivals and local communities, the VOC opted instead to treat
the Chinese community as useful conduits who offered the Dutch important access to labor and
trading opportunities. Even when pressures and resistance increased throughout Batavia and the
surrounding area, known as the Ommelanden, the VOC repeatedly implemented non-violent
policies to oversee and control Chinese communities. Chinese merchants were treated better than
Chinese laborers and the local Javanese communities because they controlled the profitable
Chinese trading network that greatly aided the Dutch trading company. Nonetheless, during the
century leading up to the massacre of 1740, the Dutch refrained from using violence against any
of the Chinese inhabitants in and around Batavia. Though extreme violence was used frequently
throughout the region, the VOC’s self-interest caused it to work to maintain an environment of
collaboration with the Chinese inhabitants in Batavia. The Dutch company was successful in
these objectives for a hundred and twenty-one years.
In emphasizing the Dutch efforts to work with the Chinese merchant community, this
thesis builds on the work of Leonard Blussé, but takes his arguments a step further by showing
that the Dutch deliberately sought this peaceful coexistence from the beginning of the

7

establishment of Batavia in 1619.16 From the start, the VOC pursued a relationship of
cooperation with the Chinese merchants in Batavia, which eschewed the use of violence in favor
of other means of control. The massacre of the Chinese in 1740 ran contrary to this mutuallybeneficial economic relationship that was established in Batavia. Various conditions threatened
the collaboration between the two groups. An influx of poor Chinese laborers into the area
surrounding Batavia, an economic depression, and corruption among both Chinese and Dutch
officials gave rise to the 1740 massacre. Though violence was used throughout the region, the
massacre was completely out of character with how the Dutch had treated the Chinese
inhabitants for over a century. It was an anomalous event. The official VOC reaction was to
arrest and punish the Governor in charge during the massacre, which confirms that the violent
event was not an accepted policy. Even in the midst of the war that dominated the island of Java
following the massacre, some remnants of earlier cooperation between the VOC and the
Batavian Chinese were still evident and visible.
This thesis draws upon a variety of primary sources to examine Dutch policy toward the
Chinese community and in particular their use of coercion. Letters and documents from the
Governors-General of the VOC in the Dutch East Indies to the Heeren XVII along with policies
decreed by VOC leaders provide critical perspectives on the Company’s treatment of the Chinese
merchant community. Since the VOC was a large and bureaucratic trading company, its central
archives held in the Netherlands holds vast amounts of information and documentation about the
history, holdings, and business of the Company. The local archives in Indonesia also contain
thousands of documents written by local rulers. Some of the material from the archives in the
Netherlands has been edited and published and can be accessed online. These letters and

16

Blussé, “Batavia, 1619-1740,” 160.
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documents provide a crucial Dutch perspective of the events that occurred in Southeast Asia.
H.T. Colenbrander compiled documents and letters sent by Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon
Coen in Jan Pietersz. Coen: Bescheiden Omtrent zijn bedrijf in Indie. This primary source sheds
light on the specific military events and economic decisions Governor Coen made during his
time working for the VOC from 1607 to 1629. This source is especially relevant to sustaining the
thesis of this paper because it demonstrates the importance of the Chinese merchants in the
establishment of Batavia and the profitable trading network located there. Throughout the
documents, Coen insists on the importance of utilizing the Chinese merchants to create a
lucrative trading network. Though Coen was brutal and merciless in his campaign for a trade
monopoly throughout other islands of the Indonesian archipelago, he consistently treated the
Chinese merchants differently. Coen was responsible for creating the multicultural settlement
that was established in Batavia. He sought to populate Batavia with these hardworking Chinese
merchants so that both the Chinese trading network and the VOC could benefit from each other.
Various volumes of De Opkomst Van Het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indie:
Verzameling van Onuitgegeven Stukken uit het Oud-Koloniaal Archief, compiled by J.K.J. De
Jonge, also provide important information for this thesis. These extensive volumes contain letters
written from the many Governors-General of the VOC to the Heeren XVII. Like the letters of
VOC admirals, these letters provide a vital glimpse into the attitude and policies of the
Governors-General and the VOC. They describe many historical events with great detail. The
letters sustain the idea that the Governors sought to pursue and maintain a cooperative trading
relationship with the Chinese merchants in Batavia.
Many historians use the valuable collection of policies decreed by the Governors-General
of the VOC edited by J.A. Van Der Chijs in Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek. These volumes
9

of policies are of paramount importance to the thesis of this paper. These regulations repeatedly
demonstrate that the Dutch did not pursue an official policy of violence toward the Chinese
inhabitants. Some historians such as Kemasang use these regulations to highlight the restrictions
and taxes placed on the Chinese inhabitants by the Dutch trading company. While it is true that
the Company did pass restrictive measures such as taxation on the Chinese inhabitants, it must be
recognized that these were not overtly violent regulations. The taxes and registration schemes
were best suited to raising revenues and also keeping track of the number of Chinese residents in
the colony. These were policy goals that did not require violence. This thesis’s interpretation of
the policies decreed by the Governors-General runs counter to Kemasang because they
demonstrate that the Dutch Governors used alternative measures of control. The orders and
regulations reveal that for more than a century the Dutch deliberately, consistently, and
repeatedly passed regulations that may have restricted the Chinese inhabitants of Batavia, but
they did not impose physical harm or threats of violence to control them.
Historians also analyze German eyewitness accounts to the massacre of 1740. The VOC
often employed German soldiers and sent them to participate in the trade in Batavia. Several
German soldiers witnessed the massacre, and they provide detailed accounts of the deadly event
in their memoirs. Georg Bernhardt Schwarz’s account provides a participant’s perspective that
highlights his role in killing Chinese inhabitants and plundering their homes in Batavia.17 His
account is valuable to this thesis because it offers the perspective of Europeans who willingly
participated in the Batavia massacre.

17

Georg Bernhardt Schwarz, Reise in Ost-Indien, worinnen mancherley Merkwürdigkeiten, besonders aber die
Anno 1740 in seiner Anwesenheit zu Batavia fürgefallene Rebellion der Chinesen, und deroselben darauf erfolgte
grose Massacre umständlich und aufrichtig beschrieben worden (Heilbronn: Franz Joseph Eckebrecht, 1751),
http://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?PPN63075120X.

10

Memoirs and journals of both Dutch and English admirals provide an important insight
into the world of European exploration and the struggle for control over trade in the region. The
Journal of John Jourdain, 1608-1617 offers an English perspective on the rivalry between the
English and Dutch trading companies in Southeast Asia. The experiences of Admiral Jourdain
paint a vivid picture of how competition and war dominated the European mindset and the
treatment of the indigenous peoples in territories the Europeans controlled. The memoirs and
letters that the Dutch admiral Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge wrote during his voyage to Indonesia
from 1605 to 1608 provide a particularly useful perspective on the VOC’s initial establishment in
the region.18 Matelieff was the first Dutch official to recognize the importance of establishing a
central base in Jakarta. He also consistently reiterated the importance of the VOC’s goals of
combating the Iberian Powers throughout Southeast Asia and gaining a monopoly on the spice
trade. The messages throughout these letters set a precedent for the policies that his successors
would also follow and implement.
The anonymous Chinese Annals of Batavia provides an invaluable Chinese eyewitness
perspective on Chinese society in Batavia and a detailed description of the 1740 massacre.
Though the author’s identity is unknown, he certainly was pro-VOC. It is very possible that the
author was a secretary of the Chinese Council in Batavia.19 Hence, it is a source that expresses a
perspective from the Chinese merchant class on the island of Java. Since there was a social and
economic division in Batavia between the Chinese merchant elite and impoverished Chinese
workers, this source cannot be interpreted as being representative of Chinese opinion in Batavia.
Nonetheless, it is a valuable and unique source because it gives insight into how some Chinese

18

Peter Borschberg, ed., Journal, Memorials, and Letters of Cornelis Matelieff De Jonge: Security, Diplomacy and
Commerce in 17th-century Southeast Asia (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2015).
19
Blussé and Dening, The Chinese Annals of Batavia, 27.
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elite viewed the massacre and who they blamed for it. This eclectic selection of sources work
together to describe the events that occurred in Batavia in 1740.
This thesis is organized into four main chapters with an introduction and a conclusion
chapter. The first main chapter provides important background information about the creation of
the VOC and the establishment of its headquarters in Batavia. It also introduces the overseas
Chinese merchants and their impact on islands in Southeast Asia. The next chapter aids the thesis
argument because it provides the context of colonial violence throughout the region, but also
explains that the Dutch treatment of Chinese merchants in Batavia differed from the events in the
Banda islands. The chapter also includes a comparison of Spanish policies toward Chinese
merchants in Manila, which provides a relevant and stark contrast to the Dutch policies in Java.
The chapter that follows analyzes the various policies the VOC implemented to control the
Chinese inhabitants of Batavia and its surrounding area and highlights the various economic
factors and corruption that led to the massacre. The chapter offers a brief description of the
massacre and then contends that the massacre was an anomaly due to the long standing period of
cooperation between the Dutch and Chinese merchants and due to the arrest of Governor
Valckenier, who was in charge during the massacre. The final main chapter analyzes the period
of warfare that dominated Java after the massacre. It demonstrates that even though the Dutch
used violent armed forces to combat Chinese rebels during the Java War, the VOC did return to
the implementation of policies that encouraged cooperation with the Chinese merchants who
remained in Batavia. The conclusion chapter reiterates the various situations that made the 1740
massacre an anomaly for the Dutch governance of the Chinese merchants in Batavia.

12

CHAPTER 2 INTERNATIONAL TRADE, JAVA AND ITS INHABITANTS

For centuries Europeans had sought spices and other exotic goods from Asia through
intermediaries in the Eastern Mediterranean. Then at the end of the fifteenth century the
Portuguese established a sea route to Asia around the southern tip of Africa and then within a
few decades a trading-post empire that allowed them to control much of the spice trade in the
Indian Ocean.20 Other European nations soon challenged the Portuguese for control of lucrative
trading opportunities in Asia, including its neighbor Spain that came to control the Philippines
and had ambitions to seize the Spice Islands in modern Indonesia as well.21 By the end of the
sixteenth century, the Dutch also became active participants in the Asian trading network for
both economic and political reasons.

Creating the VOC
The Dutch Republic experienced great economic prosperity during the seventeenth
century, also known as the Dutch Golden Age. Dutch wealth depended heavily on the Baltic
trade, but after 1580 Dutch merchants increasingly focused their attention to the spice trade in
the East. An important factor that aided the Dutch in becoming a mercantile world power was the
internal political structure in the United Provinces.22 The Dutch established “a decentralized
government made up of merchants, cheap goods and services, and an innovative environment.”23
This environment fostered opportunities for economic growth, with the Dutch particularly

20

Parthesius, Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters, 11.
Ibid.
22
Peter C. Emmer, “The First Global War: The Dutch versus Iberia in Asia, Africa and the New World, 15901609,” E-Journal of Portuguese History 1, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 3,
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excelling in shipbuilding, manufacturing, and the carrying trade.24 These advantages quickly
elevated the Dutch into formidable competitors against their European rivals.
Several different Dutch trading companies became especially competitive in the East.
Each sought to gain exclusive rights to the various spices, especially those from Indonesia. Sixtyfive Dutch ships were sent by six different companies to Asia between 1597 and 1602.25 Dutch
merchants competed successfully with Portuguese traders, but they were also competing with
each other, which increased the price of pepper and other spices.26 To increase profits, Dutch
merchants began to entertain the possibility of combining their various competing enterprises
into a single Dutch trading company. Though negotiations were difficult, the companies
eventually merged into the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) in 1602, becoming the
largest joint-stock company in the world at the time. Furthermore, the founding of the VOC
resulted in the first modern stock exchange. Many residents of the United Provinces invested in
the VOC, making it the first company owned by its investors. The investors had the right to hold
that capital permanently or they could recoup their capital by selling their stock. Consequently, a
stock exchange was established in Amsterdam for the trading of VOC stock.
The structure of the VOC was flexible and strong, and they were a significant competitor
in the maritime trade in Asia. It only took a few decades for the VOC to become “the most
powerful trading corporation in the seventeenth-century world and the model for the large-scale
business enterprises that now dominate the global economy.”27 The success of the Company was
largely due to the freedom it enjoyed. The decentralized company was highly independent

24

Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 6; Parthesius, Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters, 11.
26
Parthesius, Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters, 34.
27
Timothy Brook, Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World (New York, NY:
Bloomsbury Press, 2008), 16.
25

14

because it was structured after the constitution of the Republic of the Seven United
Netherlands.28 Since there were six trading companies that merged together to form the VOC,
there were six Chambers. The Chambers or Kamers represented the cities of Amsterdam,
Zeeland, Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Delft, and Rotterdam.29 These Chambers also had a great degree of
freedom in decision-making. Each Chamber was controlled by “its own Board of Directors, with
the VOC’s general management consisting of a central board of seventeen directors, the socalled Heeren Zeventien (Gentlemen of Seventeen).”30 The Heeren XVII made collaborative
decisions for the whole Company.
The United Provinces gave the VOC extensive powers. It granted the VOC the right to
appoint its own Governors-General who ruled the Company’s territorial possessions. It also
granted the VOC powers usually reserved to states to “make treaties with rulers and states in
Asia, to build fortifications, and to undertake military operations.”31 Political considerations may
have played a role in the Dutch government’s decision to grant the VOC sweeping powers. In the
middle of the sixteenth century, Philip II, the Habsburg ruler of Spain, also controlled the Low
Countries, which included the future Dutch Republic. Beginning in 1568, the Dutch Revolt, also
known as the Eighty Years’ War, was a war fought between the United Provinces and their
Habsburg overlords. The Dutch opposed Spain’s political and religious claims to sovereignty
over the Low Countries. When Philip II ascended the Portuguese throne in 1580, he unified the
Iberian countries under one ruler. The Portuguese controlled much of the spice trade in the East.
The unification of the two countries put the United Provinces’ mortal enemy in control of the
primary source for Dutch spices. Even though the Dutch were on their way to becoming the chief
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conduit of trade in the Baltic, they shifted their attention to securing access to spices from the
East. The Dutch wanted spices not just for their own consumption, but because their trading
partners in the Baltic wanted them too. Thus, the VOC’s goals were to profit from the spices and
to combat the Iberian powers against which the Dutch people were at war. The VOC intended to
undermine its Habsburg adversaries by seizing control of the lucrative trade with the east that
would otherwise help Philip II finance his war against the Dutch.32 These factors strongly fueled
the ambitious Dutchmen in their overseas trade. Hence, the war in Europe fueled the Dutch
interest in spices in the East.
By virtue of its expansive shipping industry, the Dutch quickly enlarged their influence
all over the world in the seventeenth century, but especially in the islands of Southeast Asia
where they competed directly with their Iberian enemies. The VOC used its charter rights to
wage war and seize territory to attack Portuguese and Spanish ships and forts in the East. The
spice trade in the East was immediately lucrative for the VOC. In order to benefit even more
from this trade, commanders of the VOC understood that it would be very advantageous for them
to establish a more permanent base for conducting business in Southeast Asia.

Looking for a Rendezvous
The Dutch realized the lucrative potential of spices in Southeast Asia a few decades
before the VOC was established. Spices, especially pepper, made Dutch merchants very wealthy.
After the founding of the VOC, this company established hundreds of outposts in Asian towns
that held offices and warehouses for the spice trade. Though they had these various outposts
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throughout the region, the VOC’s trade in Southeast Asia became so extensive that they needed
control of a whole city with good port facilities in which they could base their operations to
oversee departures and return voyages. A permanent central base in Asia was essential to the
success of the Dutch trading network.
The need for a central base of operations was first expressed by Admiral Cornelis
Matelieff de Jonge. Matelieff was a director of the VOC and fleet commander during his voyage
to Asia from 1605-1608.33 He wrote a series of epistolary memorials that provided advice and
instructions to improve trade and VOC voyages in Asia. Matelieff’s memorials were filled with
recommendations of a place where ships could gather to form a convoy before embarking to
other islands or on a homebound voyage.34 He termed this permanent base a rendezvous.
Admiral Matelieff described the importance of this rendezvous in his memorial titled “Discourse
on the State of the East Indies,” which was dated 12 November 1608. He contends,

First of all, we must choose a rendezvous or meeting place in the Indies, where all ships
from these lands can easily call and take in fresh supplies. All provisions, foodstuffs and
ammunition of war should also be brought there and amassed gradually, for in the Indies
it is impossible to obtain these quickly. This has not been attempted at all thus far,
although it is what we need most in the East Indies. All goods from all regions could also
be brought and kept safely there, for inland navigation with large ships involves a lot of
expenses and inconvenience. One ought to use the large ships mostly against the enemy
and have them closest at hand to help all those who might be in distress in the East
Indies.35
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The Admiral’s idea of a central base was certainly a new and innovative idea. He believed a
rendezvous would shorten the time ships took to get home, which would optimize profits.
Matelieff continues,

Therefore, if we want to do anything useful here in the Indies, we have to see to it that we
obtain a place as well, where we can rest when we come from Holland. This will bring us
much profit, such as the restoration of our people and ships in the first place, and
secondly the increase of our reputation with the Indian princes and peoples who thus far
do not place much trust in us, saying: “It’s true that the Dutch are good people, better
than Spanish and Portuguese, but what use is it? They come here in passing only, and
once they have their ships full they leave again.”36
Matelieff passionately felt that establishing a rendezvous would benefit relations with indigenous
populations, which would undoubtedly result in economic gain for the Company. Recognizing
the importance of establishing a permanent headquarters for the Company in Asia, he strove to
find the perfect location.
Due to his familiarity with the islands of Southeast Asia, Matelieff provided six possible
locations for this rendezvous, and in turn evaluated each position. Some of the possible locations
included Melaka, ports on the Malay Peninsula, and ports like Banten and Jakarta located along
the Sunda Strait on the island of Java. Of the options he mentioned, Jakarta became Matelieff’s
favorite location. One of the advantages of this city was that it was accessible year round and
under any kind of wind condition. This accessibility provided a quick turn-around of ships,
which inevitably saved money.37 As Matelieff summarized:

Therefore, I would choose one out of two places: either the city of Jayakerta (or the
freshwater river there, three or four miles west in the direction of Banten), or the city of
Palembang on Sumatra. Then again, Palembang is equally hard to reach when the
36
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monsoon approaches and one sails into the Sunda Strait from the outside. This has
recently become evident, in January 1608, as Paul van Caerden tried to reach Johor from
Bantan and was unable to sail very far. My best advice would be, therefore, that we
negotiate with the king of Jayakerta, so that we can build a fortress either in his city or at
the aforementioned freshwater river; the Sunda Strait can be sailed in every season, either
to Banten or to Jayakerta, if one has rounded the Cape of Good Hope and one does not
have to endure the monsoon.38
This detailed assessment of the benefits of establishing a permanent base in Jayakerta (Jakarta)
was fundamental in conducting efficient trade in Southeast Asia. Additionally, it aided the Dutch
in their fight against the Iberian powers in the region. Matelieff’s recommendation of a
rendezvous in Jakarta on the island of Java would have a significant impact on the success of the
Company.

Securing Jakarta
When the Dutch settled in Southeast Asia in the beginning of the seventeenth century,
there were strong indigenous states present throughout the region. The two most powerful
Javanese kingdoms at the time were the kingdom of Kartasura and the kingdom of Mataram. The
state of Mataram was founded in Central Java by the end of the sixteenth century. Sultan Agung
was the most powerful monarch of the Mataram dynasty because he expanded the territory
throughout the island.39 These prosperous times eventually ended for the powerful dynasty due to
the tyrannical rule of Amangkurat I. It was during this troubled time for the Mataram dynasty
that the kingdom of Kartasura was established. These kingdoms were led by ruling courts that
consisted of the leading rulers of the region. The Javanese courts established the official policies
of the people who lived in the kingdom. Another powerful leader who would become a threat to
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the various courts was Pangeran Cakraningrat. Cakraningrat skillfully ruled the island of
Madura, but he also sought to control Java.40 The various rulers had frequently clashed and
fought over territory throughout Java. The relationship between these courts became more
complicated when the European powers arrived.
The European sea-faring nations established colonial outposts in order to conduct trade.
Initially, simple trading posts were created. Eventually more permanent outposts became
necessary to secure control over trade. The European companies constructed factories made up
of warehouses and fortifications. Many colonial fortresses were created throughout Southeast
Asia. This was certainly the case on the island of Java in Indonesia. The British East India
Company and the VOC gained permission from the sultan of Banten to establish warehouses in
his kingdom at the turn of the seventeenth century.41 Both European trading companies sought to
establish monopolies of trade on the island, and this rivalry often ended in violence. Hence the
environment in Banten was unstable. Realizing the great potential of the Javanese town Jakarta,
the VOC signed a contract with the Prince of Jakarta in 1610 that granted permission to the
Company to build fortresses and warehouses in the city.42 Tensions and distrust continued to
exist in Java between the English and the Dutch as well as between the rulers of Banten and
Mataram.
General Matelieff was instrumental in his recommendation of Jakarta as the best place for
a permanent base. Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen held the same sentiments as General
Matelieff. Coen was appointed Governor-General in 1618, but he understood the necessity of a
central base at Jakarta as early as 1614.43 By the time he was appointed as Governor-General, he
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wanted to capture the city of Jakarta and secure it for the VOC. Coen used instability on the
island to his advantage. The rulers of Banten and the court of Mataram, under the leadership of
Sultan Agung, were fighting for control over the regions of Banten and Jakarta. Consequently,
those indigenous groups would not form an alliance against the Company. The English were too
distrustful of either indigenous group to form an alliance. Ever the cunning leader, Coen
recognized these weaknesses, and he capitalized on them.
General Coen’s first action in capturing Jakarta was to fortify the defenses of the Dutch
buildings and to increase the garrison stationed there.44 In response, the Bantenese and English
also strengthened their separate forces. By December 1618, however, Coen’s forces were
outnumbered by the English. Recognizing the need for reinforcement, Coen decided to sail to the
Moluccas to request additional aid.45 Fortunately for the VOC, the English and Bantenese forces
could not agree on how to attack the Dutch fort. Some minor fighting occurred, but a stalemate
was quickly reached. By the end of January 1619, the English withdrew due to the Bantenese
presence. Then, the stronger Bantenese forces removed the Prince of Jakarta from the city.46 The
Dutch forces were able to maintain control of Jakarta until Coen returned in May 1619. With
superior reinforcements in tow, Coen was able to formally establish the port at Jakarta for the
VOC. Wanting to honor the Batavians, who were the ancestors of the Dutch, they renamed the
city and fort Batavia.47
After its seizure, Batavia became the administrative center of the Company’s shipping
network in all of Southeast Asia.48 In September 1627, Jan Pieterszoon Coen returned to Batavia,
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and he became the commanding officer of the VOC for two terms as the Governor-General of
the Dutch East Indies.49 Though the Dutch were successful in establishing their rendezvous in
Jakarta, the VOC headquarters continued to experience some resistance from the strong
indigenous forces. Sultan Agung of Mataram was an ambitious ruler who strove to expand his
Javanese empire throughout the island. The presence of the VOC threatened his growing empire,
and he sought to eliminate his opponent. Sultan Agung and his men orchestrated two deadly
attacks against Coen and the VOC.50 Coen proved to be a skillful and ruthless adversary. He
launched multiple counterattacks using his superior naval forces. By October 1628 a
reinforcement of Javanese forces arrived to attack Batavia. Though there were many Javanese
casualties, the Javanese challenge against the fortress of Batavia was successful enough to place
Batavia at great risk of falling to the Javanese.51 However, this dire situation eventually changed.
The Javanese became frustrated with the failure to capture the fortress, so they withdrew.
Nevertheless, Sultan Agung regrouped and renewed his efforts to take over Batavia again,
sending another force to the city in August. This siege of Batavia in 1629 ended disastrously for
the Javanese who suffered many fatalities due to disease and starvation.52 After the failure of the
second siege, Sultan Agung recognized that the VOC could not be driven out of Java. The VOC
had successfully secured Batavia from enemy attack.
Initially, Sultan Agung allied himself economically and diplomatically with the
Portuguese at Malacca and India.53 Eventually, he realized that the Portuguese were not strong
enough to combat the VOC. Recognizing the power of the VOC, Sultan Agung began to
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establish an alliance with the Company. Open warfare between Dutch and Javanese ships came
to an end. However, an official declaration of peace never materialized because the sultan
refused to release the eighty Dutchmen he held captive.54 This fact notwithstanding, Sultan
Agung and his forces transitioned their focus from battling the Dutch to fighting indigenous
enemies around the island of Java, and the VOC remained strong in their headquarters in
Batavia. Though General Coen was instrumental in securing the fortress or rendezvous at Batavia
in Jakarta, he would not witness the further success of the town. Ailments, including dysentery
and cholera, plagued Coen. He died from these ailments on September 20, 1629.55 Coen was
considered a national hero in the Netherlands for establishing the Dutch as masters of the
Indonesian trade. Despite, or perhaps due to, his ruthless leadership, Coen fortified the city of
Batavia for the VOC.

Relationships and Tensions in Java
The indigenous courts quickly learned that it was advantageous to align themselves, both
economically and militarily, with the powerful Dutch trading company. Due to an agreement
established with the kingdom of Mataram, the VOC was permitted to erect fortresses and build
shipyards throughout Java.56 It was during the late seventeenth century that forts were
established at Tegal, Semarang, and Rembang, and smaller trading posts were created in places
such as Demak and Juwana.57 These posts were much smaller than the large city of Batavia
where the VOC had gained concessions over the whole city. The smaller outposts were
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technically under Dutch control; but in reality they were within the orbit of Javanese authority.
As Nagtegaal concisely explains, “The fortresses had only two areas of responsibility: on the one
hand, they had a military role to play, and on the other hand, they had to serve the Company’s
trading interests. In practice, however, the Dutch Residents often brought considerable political
pressure to bear, informally, on the Javanese regents.”58 The Dutch did realize, however, that it
would be beneficial to have alliances with indigenous peoples. Alliances would certainly aid
them in the establishment of their lucrative trading network in Java and throughout Southeast
Asia. The diplomatic relations between the VOC and the Javanese courts were complicated. The
majority of the Javanese elite wanted to side with the VOC for political reasons, but it was not
always a simple arrangement. Since both the kingdoms in Java and the Company made
diplomatic agreements that benefited their own interests, circumstances frequently changed these
agreements.
The VOC was particularly wary of its alliance with the Mataram Empire, which it treated
with distrust. Though the VOC had initially had a mutually beneficial agreement with the court
of Mataram, this relationship was severed after a deadly event. In 1686 Captain Francois Tack
was sent to address a disagreement between the Company and Mataram, but the Balinese rebel
Surapati intervened in the conflict. Surapati became a threat to both the court under the rule of
Amangkurat II and the Company. Surapati convinced Amangkurat II’s Balinese bodyguards to
fight on his side, resulting in the death of Captain Tack and 67 other European soldiers.59 This
event caused the VOC to distrust the kingdom of Mataram. Since Surapati had murdered these
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VOC members in 1686, the Company wanted him captured or killed.60 This request was never
fulfilled, and Surapati continued to be a strong opponent throughout Java.
In order to maintain the strong trading network in Batavia, the VOC continued to provide
military support to its allies throughout Java. Surapati continued to pose a threat to the sultans of
the island. Nearly a decade later, Surapati became a threat to Sultan Amangkurat II of Mataram.
Amangkurat II reached out to his Dutch allies for help because his kingdom was in a state of
collapse. In a letter written in 1699 he pleads, “I fear in my heart that without the help and succor
of Your Illustrious Excellency my country will be lost and this is why I so greatly desire the
power and assistance of the Company.”61 Though the Dutch did not fully trust the court, they did
finally intervene on their behalf in 1704, albeit reluctantly.62 The VOC also provided military
support in the various conflicts that plagued the courts from within. The rebel Surapati continued
to be a formidable opponent until his death in 1706.63 The alliances and relationships between
the Javanese courts and the VOC were messy and self-serving on both ends. However, they do
demonstrate the need for the alliances that existed on the island. The sultans and their courts
recognized that they needed the military support of the powerful Europeans, and the VOC
understood that peace benefitted their trading operations and the security of their headquarters on
Java.
The Javanese courts continued to participate in conflicts. Additionally, there were
tensions within the courts themselves. The Mataram Empire was greatly weakened by these
internal conflicts. Consequently, the First Javanese War of Succession erupted in 1704 after the
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death of Amangkurat II. The VOC was heavily involved because they had established alliances
with these indigenous peoples and provided military support to Amangkurat II’s brother
Pakubuwana I.64 The First War of Succession ended after five years with the defeat of
Amangkurat III. This victory helped Pakubuwana I take the throne. The VOC had played an
instrumental role in this victory, but peace did not reign for long. Pakubuwana I died in 1719,
sparking the Second Javanese War of Succession from 1719 to 1723.65 Again, the VOC was
pulled into this new war. The Company sided with Amangkurat IV against his brother and the
rebels that supported him.66 Due to the military strength of the Company, Amangkurat IV was
able to defend his throne. The VOC, whose major focus was to maintain a profitable trading
company, still became a major participant in the conflicts of the island. In return for military
support, the various sultans had financial obligations to the VOC, which were often represented
in payments of cash and rice.67 Although the Dutch often displayed a reluctance to participate in
these indigenous wars, the VOC understood the importance of maintaining diplomatic
relationships with the various peoples of the island.
From the beginning of the VOC’s presence on the island, the Company strove to maintain
economic relations with their allies on Java. The courts had the same goal since they needed the
military support of the powerful Company. The Company continued to provide aid to its allies
throughout the seventeenth century. Unfortunately, these political and economic arrangements
with the indigenous peoples of Java became more complicated throughout the following century.
The 1730s brought additional conflicts between the court located in Kartasura and the rebellious
leader Cakraningrat. Cakraningrat skillfully positioned himself between the court and the
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Company.68 This position would help him gain control over a significant part of Java in the
following decade. Due to the various treaties between the court and the VOC, the Company was
expected by their ally to provide more military support than they actually ended up providing.69
The VOC, however, was exhausted by the continuous violence and warfare on the island. In this
particular conflict, the Company refused to provide military support. Consequently, the
indigenous courts interpreted this denial of military support as a release from any obligation they
had previously had to the Company.

Overseas Chinese in Java
There was a continuous and substantial Chinese presence in the islands of Southeast Asia
starting centuries before the Europeans arrived. Chinese government policy concerning its
subjects abroad shifted through time. As large numbers of Chinese established themselves in
Korea, Japan, and the islands in Southeast Asia during the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing
dynasties,70 some of these dynasties implemented strict policies about the Chinese travelers who
moved away from their Chinese homeland. The rulers of these dynasties either considered these
Chinese merchants as sojourners who would eventually come back to China or as lawbreakers
who would be punished if they returned.71 Hence, once a Chinese citizen had officially emigrated
away from China, they were no longer under the protection of the Chinese dynasty. They were
shunned. Nonetheless, recognizing the economic advantages of other islands throughout
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Southeast Asia, hundreds of thousands of Chinese people emigrated or sojourned away from
China.
Centuries before the arrival of the Dutch, Chinese merchants became instrumental both in
the trade between China and Southeast Asia and in the internal trading networks of the region.72
Their influence only grew when European powers came to the region. Some Chinese merchants
had become very wealthy because they “acted as intermediaries between the Dutch or English
East India companies and riverine rulers or collection centers.”73 Chinese merchants allowed the
Europeans to tap into the established Chinese trading networks.
Some of the greatest Chinese seafarers were the Fukienese who inhabited the Fujian
province. Due to the difficult terrain of Fujian, the Fukienese had learned to import rice from
other provinces and established an impressive trading network that also traded in products like
porcelain, ironware, and textiles.74 As early as the fourteenth century, these Chinese merchants
became pioneers of long-distance trade. By the sixteenth century the Chinese government passed
a policy encouraging Fukienese merchants in the overseas trade, issuing over a hundred trade
licenses in 1575.75 Some of these Chinese merchants became very wealthy. The Ocean trade
routes in Southeast Asia were divided into the Eastern and Western trade routes. The Eastern
trade route was more lucrative because it led to the Philippines, where silver from South America
was traded.76 The Chinese there settled mostly in Manila and traded with the Spanish. The
Western trade route went to the Malay Peninsula and Western Java.77 Initially, the port of Banten
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was an important trade market, but many Chinese merchants eventually also settled in the region
around Jakarta.
In Batavia, the Dutch quickly established a trade link with Chinese merchants. The large
Chinese junks brought rich cargoes and thousands of new settlers to Batavia and the surrounding
towns. The Dutch relied heavily on Chinese junks to export goods from Batavia such as pepper,
sandalwood, incense, buffalo horns, elephant tusks, and large quantities of silver to China and
other Southeast Asian ports.78 Pepper was sold in especially great quantities. Over three thousand
tons of pepper came through Batavia in 1644 alone.79 Chinese junks were able to export and ship
goods at a much cheaper rate than if the Dutch sent their own ships to China. The trading
network between the Chinese and Dutch became so lucrative, they eventually relied exclusively
on Chinese junks for shipping and trading goods.

Dutch Inhabitants in Batavia
Initially, the VOC planned to populate Batavia with Dutch citizens. As Admiral Matelieff
envisioned it, “families would be brought there from Holland, so that one would have all kinds of
crafts and business there. His Majesty’s lands would profit from this and could then be provided
with everything necessary.”80 The admiral believed that Batavia could become an important
colonial city for the Dutch. Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen had the same vision. He
initially promoted a policy that optimized the influx of Dutchmen to Batavia.81 He urged the
Heeren XVII to send Dutch citizens, even women or girls, to Batavia to populate it. In his letter
to Holland in October 1620 Coen explained that “there could be many more servants for the
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Company if they sent more younger, honest women or daughters. In this way, God willing, the
territory they have in Asia can become a fundamental place (even to the point of being
considered a place of high social standing).”82 While initially the Heeren XVII pursued this
policy, they eventually reversed course as it came to be viewed as a failure and with it the dream
of creating a city populated by Dutch citizens in the East.
Another problem that arose from sending Dutch people to populate Batavia was that most
did not stay for long. Few Dutchmen settled permanently, instead returning home as soon as they
were able. To prevent this from occurring, VOC authorities encouraged marriages between
Dutchmen and Indonesian women so that they would be compelled to remain with their Asian
families in Batavia.83 Though this plan did tie a few Dutchmen to Batavian soil, it did not greatly
increase the Dutch population in Batavia. Batavia did not become the great Dutch colonial city
that Admiral Matelieff and Governor-General Coen had envisioned. Instead Coen shifted VOC
efforts to populating Batavia with Chinese merchants.

Demand for Chinese in Batavia
Since the Chinese had established an expansive trading network throughout Southeast
Asia before Europeans settled there, the Chinese always greatly outnumbered the Dutch in the
islands.84 As early as 1607, Admiral Matelieff noted the presence of Chinese merchants and
ships conducting trade in the region and specifically with Manila. In a letter of advice to Admiral
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Paul van Caerden in which he explained the situation in the East, Matelieff also noted the
Chinese presence remarking, “Nor should you believe that you can keep up with the Chinese
junks if your ships are ill-kept and slow.”85 His earliest reports make clear that Matelieff
understood that efficient Chinese ships dominated the carrying trade in the region.
Matelieff also recognized the importance of Chinese merchants and laborers throughout
the region. He believed that the Chinese merchants would come to Jakarta if the Dutch
established a permanent base there. In regard to creating a central fort, Admiral Matelieff
contends,

Private merchants should sail there with linen or pieces of cloth and then come to
Jayakerta to sell whatever they came across there. If people talk about the Chinese goods
that would be brought there, they are mistaken: if we were permanently settled at
Jayakerta, all the Chinese would come there, and those coming to Patani do not bring
anything, but what the people there need. Someone could add that if this factory were
well managed, it would bring in some profit from Chinese trade.86
Admiral Matelieff rightly predicted the lucrative trade relationship that was established with
Chinese merchants in the centuries that followed. He recognized the importance of the Chinese
in overseas trade. Additionally, Matelieff perceived the Chinese as hard workers. He mentioned,
“When it comes to carpentry, one could also employ Chinese workers, who would come in great
numbers and are fit for all kinds of labour.”87 The Dutch considered the Chinese to be
fundamental catalysts to their success in trade and establishing a permanent base in Southeast
Asia. Thus from the origins of Batavia, the Chinese played a vital role in the success of the
Company and its headquarters.
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Governor-General Coen knew the success of Batavia depended on Chinese merchants.
When the Dutch established Batavia in the Dutch East Indies, Chinese inhabitants from other
parts of the Indonesian archipelago were encouraged to work in Batavia. The importance of
Chinese workers is evident by the fact that when the VOC was determining the best location for
the center of operations in 1619, they considered Batavia because it was accessible to Chinese
sailing ships.88 Coen instantly realized that the Chinese were exactly the kind of laborers they
needed in Batavia and that they would play a vital role in the inter-archipelago trade.
Consequently, he spoke very highly of the Chinese. In his June 1623 letter to the Heeren XVII he
wrote, “There is no group of people that serves us better than the Chinese or is as easily to come
by as the Chinese.”89 The Chinese were hard workers and there were many Chinese laborers
available. Due to these factors, Coen adamantly pushed for the immigration of Chinese workers.
This policy was swiftly put into place, and the ethnic makeup of Batavia quickly changed. In
various letters written to the Heeren XVII, Coen described how important the Chinese were.90 He
believed the Chinese merchants and laborers would be beneficial to the establishment of Batavia.
Chinese immigration to Batavia quickly ensued. However, not all migration was
voluntary; at least some coercion was involved. Some historians explain that one such way was
through the use of kidnapping Chinese people from the China coast.91 In his letter from 6
September 1622, Coen wrote, “All the Chinese people who were on the coast of China, Manila,
and other places, should, in our opinion, be used.”92 Though kidnapping might be too strong of a
word, Coen did want to use these Chinese workers to his advantage. Undoubtedly, some Chinese
88
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were brought to Batavia against their own will. In the 1620s the Dutch forced large numbers of
Chinese traders to move from Banten to Batavia.93 Since Batavia was the Company’s central
headquarters, it makes sense that Coen would want to populate Batavia, instead of Banten, with
Chinese merchants.
Since Coen’s original plan of populating Batavia with Dutchmen failed, he instead
focused on populating Batavia with Chinese merchants and laborers. However, the growth of the
population of Batavia was not only through coercive means. Many Chinese people recognized
the economic benefits of Batavia along with the advantages of working with the prosperous and
powerful Dutch Company. Within a year, thousands of Chinese workers were arriving in Batavia
aboard Chinese junks.94 As time progressed, Chinese merchants realized the profit that was
possible if they worked with the Company. The Chinese merchants played a vital role in
facilitating the migration of Chinese labor to take advantage of the economic opportunities.
Consequently, thousands of Chinese workers continued to migrate to and inhabit the island of
Java throughout the seventeenth century. These factors created a large Chinese population in and
around Batavia.
VOC profits were based on trade that actively integrated Chinese merchants into
expanding Dutch commercial networks.95 The VOC trading post empire also relied on the
Chinese labor, with its many trading centers, including the fortified city in Batavia, largely built
and inhabited by Chinese workers. The city was built with the intention of housing Dutch
immigrants, but, as already noted, this policy was not successful. Though it was difficult to
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convince Dutchmen to settle in Batavia, the Chinese that came to Batavia had few problems
settling in. In a letter to the Heeren XVII from 5 August 1619 Coen wrote, “We have our hands
full due to negotiations with the enemy. The Chinese are stopping the prince of Banten. Then
who can build the castle and city at Jakarta?” 96 The solution to Coen’s dilemma was found in the
many Chinese settlers on the island of Java. So Coen used the numerous Chinese inhabitants to
assist in the building of the city. A year later in a letter written in October 1620, Coen informed
the generals in Holland that “the Company is stabilizing the rendezvous at Jakarta with the
captured Javanese and with a good party of Chinese that were there.”97 The Chinese inhabitants
played an important role in creating the structures of the city. They built houses, as well as
owned and ran successful artisan shops in the city.98 Unlike other European colonial settlements
where the Chinese and indigenous peoples were segregated into living places outside of the
fortified cities, the Dutch welcomed the Chinese people inside Batavia, where they all lived
together. Since the VOC was unsuccessful in populating Batavia with Dutchmen, it was the
Chinese that became the first true settlers in Batavia.
These Chinese settlers were involved in financial and economic matters since they aided
in the shipping business that was in Batavia. Though Chinese merchants and the Dutch
collaborated in maintaining a successful economic partnership, some historians believe the
working relationship between the Dutch and Chinese was an unbalanced one. Kemasang argues,
“The Dutch supplied the capital and land whereas the role of the Chinese was limited to
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supplying the labor.”99 Historians like Kemasang contend that the Chinese were never
considered as equals to the Dutch. In general, the Dutch considered Asian culture inferior to
European culture, while they considered Asian culture superior to African culture.100 Initially,
the Dutch found the Chinese favorable because they were not a political or cultural threat to their
rule.101 Consequently, the Dutch did not oppose the Chinese, and instead welcomed their labor.
Racism and superiority were certainly factors in this era. It is vital to remember, however, that
many Chinese migrant workers earned considerable wealth in their partnership with the VOC.
This is why thousands of Chinese merchants lived and worked in Batavia by their own will.
Many Chinese inhabitants enjoyed their prosperous lives in Batavia so much that they stayed and
married Balinese women.102 In some cases, Chinese merchants were given more privileges than
Europeans. The Chinese were encouraged to trade with the Dutch because the goods they
brought benefited the Company and Batavia.103 The Dutch were certainly aware that the
Company and the establishment of Batavia were successful due to the skillful work of the
Chinese inhabitants.
Chinese merchants became a central part of Batavian society. They worked and benefited
financially from their trading relationship with the VOC. Recognizing the value of the Chinese
merchants to their trading enterprises, the VOC protected the Chinese from their Javanese
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opponents, in part by permitting them to live inside the city walls of Batavia.104 In the hundred
years that the Chinese merchants maintained economic cooperation with the Company, there was
no “Chinatown” in Batavia. Some Chinese elite even inhabited some of the best residences in
town.105 Aside from the heavy poll tax the Chinese were ordered to pay, the Chinese merchants
lived very privileged lives. The Chinese merchants were integral to the success of the Company,
and they were treated accordingly. Chinese laborers were also vital to the Dutch in Batavia
because they built and maintained the physical infrastructure of the Dutch colony. Though the
Company also sought to have a cooperative relationship with Chinese laborers, the Dutch began
to view these laborers as liabilities who eventually stirred up trouble in the countryside.
As the number of Chinese merchants increased, Governor-General Coen recognized that
he could not control the large Chinese population on his own. In October 1619 he appointed Su
Ming-kang, also known as Bencon, as the kapitein (Dutch for captain) of the Chinese.106 This
was a very privileged position, and the population of Batavia respected and treated these Chinese
officers with the same level of courtesy as the European leaders of the Company. The Chinese
captain was in charge of all civil and economic affairs of the Chinese. The kapitein also served as
a mediator between the Chinese inhabitants and the Company. The Chinese considered the
position of the captain to be a very prestigious position that they celebrated with great pomp and
circumstance.107 The kapitein system worked well for many decades. Eventually, however, the
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influx of Chinese laborers in the suburbs of Batavia, known as the Ommelanden, began to
complicate the entire system.
Though the Dutch controlled the prosperous trading Company, they certainly recognized
the vital role the Chinese merchants and laborers played in the success of the Company in
Batavia. François Valentijn was employed by the VOC as a minister in Java. He wrote various
volumes of a book titled Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien, in which he accurately described the
territories in the East Indies. Valentijn also recognized and chronicled the impressive work the
Chinese merchants conducted in Batavia. In the 1720s he noted,

Besides the Dutch, the Chinese do appear to be the most respected. It is an uncommonly
smart, polite, diligent and obliging people who do great services to this city. They not
only conduct wholesale trade in the city with tea, porcelain, silk fabrics and lacquerware;
but they also engage in many crafts, being very good blacksmiths, carpenters, very fine
chair makers, both drawing-room and usually ornamental sedan-chairs. They make all the
awnings that they use here. They varnish and gild very nicely. They are also the principal
arak burners, contractors of large leases, brick makers and sugar handlers on the mills
outside Batavia and merchants in the town. Many own the restaurants for the sailors and
soldiers, or tea houses for them too, and a large crowd of them also make money by
fetching water, fishing, or to transporting Chinese people anywhere they need (which is a
great convenience). They always stand up in the vessels with two crossed oars. Many also
use ply sampans and large vessels to collect the goods from the ships. The entire
agriculture of Batavia also depends on them, because they are extraordinarily ingenious
and diligent. Not only to make sure that they have everything throughout the year, but
they also walk everywhere with all that can be imagined, and all day long, they bring all
kinds of vegetables, fabrics, porcelains, lacquers, tea, and whatever else, to the houses for
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a small profit. There is nothing that one can imagine that they do not undertake and in
which they do not practice.108
In Valentijn’s judgment the major economic center of the VOC in Batavia relied on Chinese
merchants to function. The Dutch recognized the importance of these elite Chinese, and they
formed a mutually beneficial trading relationship with them. Chinese merchants and workers
continued to take on more roles in the century that followed. The Company especially
encouraged Chinese entrepreneurs to open sugar mills in the Ommelanden of Batavia.109 Sugar
cultivation became a success, which attracted thousands of Chinese workers to the Ommelanden
to work in the cane fields. The population of Chinese workers in and around Batavia steadily
rose. Even with the influx of Chinese immigrants that occurred in the next hundred years, the
Dutch sought to maintain a collaborative and peaceful relationship with the hardworking and
successful Chinese merchants. However, given the overriding context of war and violence that
defined relations between the Dutch and other European powers, and the Dutch and many
indigenous groups, the relative lack of violence in relations with the Chinese inhabitants in
Batavia was notable.
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CHAPTER 3 CONTEXTS OF COLONIAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The seventeenth century Dutch Golden Age took shape during a time of economic
prosperity, cultural flowering, and bitter bloody conflict. At the dawn of the century, the Eighty
Years’ War, which pitted the Dutch against their Habsburg overlords, was still decades from a
resolution and now encompassed not only intense theatres of warfare in the Netherlands but also
bloody confrontations in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia where the Dutch competed with
Habsburg Iberian kingdoms for control of the spice trade.

Portuguese Violence in Asia
The Portuguese were the first to establish an empire in the East. By dispatching
expeditions sought along the west coast of Africa, by the end of the fifteenth century the
Portuguese had established a sea route to Asia along which they built a trading post empire in the
first half of the sixteenth century with the intention of monopolizing the trade in spices and other
exotic goods from the East. From the start, the Portuguese used violence to control the Indian
Ocean sea lands by taking advantage of their superior ships and guns. Portuguese sailors also
used violence as a means to terrorize the indigenous people with whom they came into contact.
For example, in December 1508 explorer Francisco de Almeida and his fleet landed in the port
of Dabul on the western coast of India. Almeida sought to control the wealthy Muslim port, so he
instructed the men to instill as much terror as they could. His soldiers quickly obeyed by killing
every man, woman, and child in sight. The next day, the soldiers plundered and burned the
town.110 Similar massacres of inhabitants, who were usually followers of Islam, occurred along
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the coast of India, most notably in places such as Goa.111 The Portuguese explorers and soldiers
were fueled by religious zeal and economic competition. Since the Portuguese were the first
Europeans to venture out East to pursue maritime trade, they set the example of violence in the
region. The Dutch joined the overseas trading network a century after the first Portuguese
expeditions.

Dutch Rivalry with Iberian Powers
From the start, the VOC pursued both economic and military objectives as they sought to
establish a monopoly on the spice trade with Asia. While organized for trade, it sought to weaken
the Habsburg rulers of Spain and Portugal by breaking their monopoly over the sea routes to
Asia. As early as 1603 Steven van der Hagen, the first admiral of the VOC, went to Asia with an
armed fleet to destroy as many Portuguese and Spanish ships and forts possible.112 The war effort
was also a constant driving force in the mind of Admiral Matelieff and the Heeren XVII, who
frequently reiterated the importance of combating the Iberian powers. In January 1608 Admiral
Matelieff wrote a letter of advice to Admiral Paul van Caerden, in which he described his
experiences at Ternate, an Indonesian city on the island of Maluku. The Portuguese, having
constructed forts on the island as early as 1522, were oppressive rulers over the inhabitants of
Maluku. They ruled with terror and violence, and the Dutch capitalized on this. Observing the
Portuguese tyranny over the Maluku people, the Dutch strategically decided to cast themselves
as saviors of the inhabitants of Ternate. Accordingly, the Dutch devised a plan by which they
would help the indigenous peoples expel the Portuguese from their territory. In turn, the VOC
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would be able to establish Dutch control over the island and the spices for trade. When the Dutch
arrived at the island in the seventeenth century, the indigenous peoples of Ternate gladly allied
with the Dutch. Admiral Matelieff describes the situation at Ternate to Admiral van Caerden:

Now the Ternatans are scattered everywhere, so that one hardly knows where to look for
them. If I had not arrived they would all have gone their separate ways and there would
have been no hope for Ternate. But now they are starting to arrive there from Jailolo,
since they see that we are building a permanent place and do not want to abandon them.
For this is the word that is going throughout the Indies: the Dutch are better people than
the Portuguese, but we are only looking for cargo and then leave those who traded with
us in trouble. But if they see now that we are building a permanent place and protecting
it, the blacks will take our side. Already the people of Makian, who sent messengers to
see how our battle would end, promised me to take our side as soon as we had a
permanent place on Ternate. I replied to them, however, that they should keep quiet, that
I could not protect them now but had only been sent to help the Ternatans to their land,
but that they should prepare to join us when the first fleet came-which they promised to
do.113
Both Matelieff and the indigenous peoples realized that they could mutually benefit from an
alliance. The Ternatans believed the Dutch would protect them from Portuguese tyranny and
religious conversion, and the Dutch knew that the Ternatans could help them attack the
Portuguese and Spanish in the area.
The VOC also sought to weaken its Habsburg opponents by muscling in on its trade.
Matelieff observed, “I do not think it wise to attack the Spanish fort with our men alone, one
would have to bring a large number of men. Nothing is lacking but rice and sago, but all the
cloves of the island would fall into our hands in spite of the Spanish, and the Ternatans would
come right up to the Spanish fort.”114 Matelieff and other Dutch admirals recognized the twofold
mission of the VOC in Asia and obediently followed it. As a result, the VOC pursued profitable
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trade in Asia for the Netherlands while simultaneously aiding the war effort against the Iberian
powers by combating and undermining their Portuguese and Spanish enemies at every
opportunity.
The military mindset was evident even while the VOC was establishing trading forts and
seeking alliances with indigenous peoples in Southeast Asia. Even though the Company strove to
gain economic control, they also viewed themselves as a political and military force in Asia.
Matelieff understood the important role the VOC played in the war against the Habsburgs even
so far removed from the homeland. In his 12 November 1608 memorandum entitled “Discourse
on the State of the East Indies,” Matelieff identifies three opponents of the Company in the
Indies:

Firstly … the Portuguese and the Spanish, who seek to harm us by armed violence.
Secondly, the English and the French and others who, while we and the king of Spain are
fighting each other, conduct their business in peace and at little cost. Meanwhile they let
us ward off the enemy at our expense as their protectors, and then spoil the European
market by importing their spices at a low cost, without paying us convoy fees. Thirdly,
the Indians, who thanks to our protection feel liberated from the Portuguese and two
kinds of merchants such as Dutchmen and Englishmen on their market, look for the
biggest profit without acknowledging that we are the ones who liberated them. No, they
go after the best price for their goods, as is the nature of such wild tribes. As long as this
is not remedied, the expenses will fall to us and the benefits to them. Accordingly, we
have disorder in our coffers, which is such that even if we succeeded in protecting
ourselves by force of arms, our commerce could still come to chaos if we do not bring
order to our trade and our coffers. I shall deal first with the subject of protection and then
with trade.115
Matelieff understood that violence had to be used in order to combat the Company’s enemies and
to maintain control over trade in the region. While the Dutch and the Habsburgs fought in
Europe, a second theater of war also raged in Asia. Into this violent mixture, other European
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rivals, such as the English, created additional tensions between the Europeans and the indigenous
people of Asia.

European Rivalry
European rivalry over trade in the Spice Islands became increasingly violent throughout
the seventeenth century. In 1600 the English had also established a trading company known as
the East India Company. By 1613 the English established a factory in Makassar on an island in
eastern Indonesia.116 The English trading company also conducted trade with the indigenous
peoples of the islands, and this competition for spices often resulted in violence. Though the
English initially had a cooperative relationship with local rulers and communities, they
eventually strained those economic ties because of their use of coercion. Although initially
accepting the presence of the English Company, the sultan of Makassar ended up wanting the
English to leave after the English abducted and killed multiple Makasar nobility.117 In addition,
the Europeans were also attacking each other in and around the area of Makassar. Admiral Jan
Pieterszoon Coen described an attack on the VOC ship Enkhuizen by Spanish ships. The Dutch
struggled to fend off the Spanish, and eleven Dutchmen were killed in the battle.118 Warfare for
economic and political purposes was widespread between the Europeans in Asia. The English
East India Company also combated the Portuguese on various occasions. This bloody
competition between these two countries often occurred in towns along the coast of India.119
Violence was an accepted and expected part of the economic competitions between European
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powers. The Dutch also used violence against their European competitors. Tragically, local
populations were often caught in the crossfire between European colonial powers, becoming
collateral damage in these conflicts. A disastrous example of this is the heinous massacre that
occurred in the Banda Islands in 1621.

Dutch Violence in the Banda Islands
The Banda Islands of Indonesia are extremely small and remote. However, they
immediately attracted the attention of European trading companies because nutmeg and mace
were exclusively produced there.120 Since the VOC sought to establish a monopoly on trade in
the region, they quickly wanted control over the islands. When the Dutch reached them in 1599,
the Bandanese gladly accepted the help of the Dutch because they wanted to remove oppressive
Portuguese settlers from their islands.121 Joining forces with the Bandanese, the VOC
successfully expelled the Portuguese. Soon after the Dutch created contracts with the Bandanese
people to secure a monopoly on the trade of nutmeg and mace. However, it was not long before
the Bandanese indigenous peoples broke the monopoly trade agreement with the VOC. The
English trading company established a factory on the islands in 1609, buying spices from the
local population, and inciting the anger of the Dutch traders.122 This sentiment only worsened
when the Dutch Admiral Pieter Verhoeven and forty-six of his men were murdered by some
Bandanese inhabitants.123 The Dutch believed that their English competitors were behind this
deadly event, which prompted them to consider the English presence to pose a bigger threat to
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their lucrative trading system than the Iberian powers. The competition and animosity between
these European rivals had devastating effects on the Bandanese. Admiral Jan Pieterszoon Coen
arrived in the Banda islands in February of 1621. Within this context of fierce competition and
violence, Coen led a gory campaign to control the main Banda island of Lonthor. In the weeks
that followed, Coen and his commanders murdered an estimated thirteen thousand Bandanese.124
The economic competition between the European powers over spices spiraled out of control, and
violence became rampant throughout the region. Seizing enemy shipping, which served the dual
purpose of weakening an opponent while strengthening one’s own fleet, was another important
aspect of European competition around the islands of Southeast Asia. Both the Dutch and
English frequently seized ships and seizures often resulted in death.125 The context of violence
during this period was so pervasive, it reached even the most remote islands of Indonesia.

Violence between Javanese and Chinese on Java
Europeans hardly held a monopoly on violence on Java in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Various Javanese rulers fought each other for control of the island’s territories. In
addition, there were tensions and conflicts throughout Java between the Javanese and the
Chinese communities. Like many other islands in the region, large numbers of Chinese workers
settled in the various urban centers. By the end of the seventeenth century towns such as Jepara,
Semarang, and Rembang counted a few hundred Chinese men and their families as residents.126
In the decades that followed, hundreds of Chinese immigrants arrived each year, and by 1740
there were well over five thousand adult Chinese males residing on the north coast of Java.127
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The growing power and influence of the Chinese in these towns sparked violence between the
two ethnic groups.128 The Chinese role in Java was unique because “they were first and foremost
traders who reinvested their profits in the economy and had relatively little to do with the
state.”129 The Chinese merchants in Java worked very hard and many became extremely
successful and wealthy. Consequently, many Javanese people resented the Chinese merchants,
especially those who worked with the VOC. Another source of anger for the Javanese was that
some Chinese merchants assimilated very slowly to the Javanese culture. They did not wear
traditional Javanese clothing nor did they participate in other Javanese customs. 130 This
bitterness toward Chinese immigrants erupted into bouts of ethnic violence, including in 1736
when many Chinese merchants, farmers, and traders were killed.131
A socio-economic division became evident throughout Java as well. Chinese merchants
created an impressive trade network throughout the region. The Company quickly learned to
benefit from this trading system, and offered the Chinese merchants much needed protection in
return. When Javanese workers, encouraged by their lords, killed Chinese merchants, the VOC
intervened to protect the Chinese. This protection greatly aided the expansion of the Chinese
trading network.132 The two great trading networks depended on each other. However, not all
Chinese inhabitants of Java were involved in the profitable trading network. By the turn of the
eighteenth century, there was a significant gap between the small number of wealthy Chinese
merchants and the largely impoverished Chinese population, creating troubling social tensions.
There was also an influx of Chinese immigrants residing in rural areas around the cities in Java.
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They worked at sugar and saw mills and were considered the social inferiors of Chinese
merchants.133 By contrast, the elite lived in the larger towns, where they enjoyed quite a bit of
prosperity and wealth. Thus, before the massacre of 1740 there were social gaps and tensions
between the various segments of the Chinese population in Java. The war that followed the
massacre would further divide these social-economic groups on the island.

Comparison of Spanish and Dutch Policies toward Chinese Merchants
The Spanish were also an imperial force to be reckoned with that established colonies on
almost every continent. Though economic gain motivated the Spanish to participate in the
overseas trade, religion also greatly inspired the Spanish to conquer new territories. A brief
historical explanation is important in order to understand the context behind Spanish colonial
policy. The Iberian Peninsula was an eclectic mix of religions in the middle ages. Moorish
invaders conquered much of the peninsula in the eighth century, creating a society in which
Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities lived together.134 Though for a time relatively
peaceful religious coexistence prevailed, conflicts and violence did occur. Christian forces strove
to unify the entire peninsula under the Roman Catholic Church. From about 718 to 1492, the
Christian rulers combated leaders and followers of Islam. This ongoing fight in the name of
Christianity defined the Spanish character.135 In the same year that the final Iberian Moorish
territories were taken by Christian kingdoms, Christopher Columbus ushered in the age of
colonization of overseas territories. The missionary impulse of Christianity, specifically the
beliefs of the Roman Catholic Church, became a central part of the Spanish character. This
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would be evident in the ways the Spanish empire sought to colonize the various territories
around the world.
The Chinese conducted trade around the islands of the Philippines for centuries before
Spanish colonization--Chinese sources referring to the island of Luzon as early as 1372.136
Though the Chinese merchants and shippers initially just traded with islanders, they eventually
established permanent settlements around Manila Bay on the island of Luzon. Known as Luzons,
the inhabitants of these settlements extended trading networks between Luzon, China, and
Brunei.137 The eastern Chinese overseas trading route expanded under the supportive Ming
dynasty.138 Hence when the Spanish arrived in Manila in 1569, there were already an abundance
of Chinese traders in Manila Bay where the Spanish established their colony’s capital.
The Spanish were aware of these Chinese merchants, and Chinese merchants continued
to immigrate to Manila once the Spanish established a direct trading route from the Americas to
the Philippines.139 Known as the Galleon trade, Spanish ships brought mostly silver from the
Americas and traded it for Chinese and other goods at Manila.140 Chinese merchants who
transported goods from China to Manila were a critical link in this profitable trade. Chinese
shipping to Manila reached a peak of fifty-one junks in 1637.141 The Chinese also dominated the
retail and artisanal sectors of the Manila economy along with the food provisioning trade.142 As a
result, the Spanish depended heavily on the Chinese for these services. Unlike the Dutch,
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however, who welcomed the Chinese and wanted to establish a mutually beneficial economic
relationship with them, almost from the start, the Spanish feared and resented them.
Comparison of Spanish and Dutch religious philosophies in Asia. Manila was ruled
by the Spanish colonial government, and religion was a key component of the Spanish empire.
After seven centuries of religious warfare on the Iberian Peninsula, the Spanish possessed a
strong crusading tradition and believed that it was their duty to convert indigenous peoples to
Christianity all over the world. Consequently, thousands of Spanish sailors sailed to the
Philippines to “convert the heathen” and to obtain financial gain.143 Many Filipinos, indigenous
inhabitants of the Philippines, were converted to Christianity. The Spanish sought to accomplish
the same goal with the Chinese inhabitants of the island. Richard Chu concisely explains,

To ensure their loyalty and subservience, the Spanish colonial government, in
cooperation with the Catholic Church, sought to convert the Chinese. It encouraged
conversion by providing converts with benefits, such as the opportunity to marry local
women. With the establishment of more Catholic Chinese-mestizo or Chinese-indio
families, the Spaniards hoped that not only would they be carrying out their mission of
conversion, they would also be creating a colony of loyal and faithful subjects.
The Spanish need for religious conversion differed greatly from the Dutch philosophy and
treatment of the Chinese in Java. Converting indigenous peoples was not a goal which the Dutch
traders pursued. Perhaps since the Dutch were fighting for religious freedom from the Spanish in
Europe, the Dutch had no desire and saw no benefit to converting people in Southeast Asia. For
the Spanish, however, it was a central part of their mission of colonization.
Comparison of treatment of Chinese inhabitants in Java and Manila society. The
social divisions between the Europeans, the indigenous peoples, and the Chinese in Manila also
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differed from those in Java. In Manila many Chinese settlers had offspring with indigenous, or
indio, women. The Spanish designated these interracial offspring as mestizos.144 Even though
many Chinese inhabitants did convert to Catholicism, they were still treated differently than
mestizos. Instead, indios and mestizos enjoyed the same rights under the Spanish government,
while the Chinese did not.145 The Chinese were treated as inferior to the other social groups in
Manila. The Chinese were usually restricted to a certain place of residence, while the mestizos
and indios were permitted to live in more areas.146 The Chinese were also restricted from
political involvement in the Philippines. Mestizos and Indios played important roles in the local
government, something the Chinese inhabitants were restricted from doing.147 In Java, the
opposite occurred. The VOC appointed a Chinese captain who worked for the Company to reside
over the Chinese people of Batavia. These Chinese officials were respected and treated as other
Company employees. While the Chinese merchants of Manila were treated by the Spanish as
inferior to the indios and mestizos, the Chinese inhabitants of Batavia were treated by the Dutch
as superior to the indigenous peoples.
Another notable difference between the treatment of the Chinese in Batavia and Manila
was where they were permitted to reside. The Chinese merchants lived within the city walls of
Batavia. They cohabited in the city with Europeans, and they were fully incorporated into
Batavian society. The Spanish had a different policy in Manila. As early as 1581 the Chinese
were confined to an area of their own outside the city walls.148 The Spanish did not trust the
Chinese merchants, and thus they were not allowed to dwell within the city walls of Manila.
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While the Dutch lived in close proximity with many Chinese inhabitants, the Spanish segregated
the Chinese from other ethnic groups. One scholar has argued that the Spanish probably recalled
the uneasy coexistence or convivencia of the Christians, Muslims, and Jews that dominated
Spanish society during the middle ages, and now strove for an alternative society, one that kept
different cultural backgrounds separated.149 They obviously believed that this would help keep
the peace between the various people groups in the city. Wickberg highlights the impact of the
Roman Catholic faith on this policy. She contends, “Spanish social policy was one of social
division mitigated by cultural indoctrination, centering upon Catholicism, which was available to
all elements in society.”150 Though the Chinese merchants and laborers of Batavia and Manila
were very influential to the success of the trading industries in both locations, they were treated
quite differently by the two European powers.

Spanish Massacres of Chinese People in Manila
The number of Chinese workers in Manila steadily increased. By the seventeenth century
there were over twenty thousand Chinese immigrants living in Manila, and the city was
dependent on Chinese merchants and workers.151 While the Dutch in Batavia recognized the
usefulness of Chinese workers and sought to maintain a cooperative and peaceful relationship
with them, the Spanish viewed the Chinese inhabitants of Manila with suspicion. The Spanish
quickly used violence to control and suppress the Chinese inhabitants on the island. Fear was a
major motivator in their use of violence. The Spanish worried that the Chinese would conduct
uprisings against the colonial government. This apprehension was warranted since the Chinese
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population was almost ten times the Spanish population in Manila.152 The Spanish government
also implemented other restrictive measures in order to control the Chinese, such as segregation
and various forms of taxation.153 But Spanish actions indicate that they did not feel like these
measures were adequate to safeguard their authority over the burgeoning Chinese population.
Since the Chinese lived within their own living quarters, there was little sense of unity or
collaboration in Manila. Hence, the Spanish justified the use of violence as a necessary measure
for eliminating even the idea of a Chinese threat.
The first massacre of the Chinese in Manila was in 1603, only a couple of decades after
the arrival of the Spanish. In May 1603 three government officials from China arrived in Manila.
The mandarins explained that they were judges, and they were on an expedition to the island in
search of rumored gold and silver.154 This story made the Spanish very suspicious. The
Europeans interpreted the arrival of the mandarins as a sign that an invasion from China was
imminent. The events that followed are disputed between Spanish and Chinese sources. The
Chinese sources explain that the Spanish began preparing for a massacre months before the
actual event. The Spanish bought all the Chinese metal weapons they could and restricted the
Chinese inhabitants from being in groups larger than three hundred.155 This narrative supports
the idea that the Spanish planned a premeditated massacre of the Chinese community. Spanish
sources, however, state that the Chinese workers had conducted an uprising against them,
sparking the massacre.156 Regardless of the actual motivations behind the massacre, mass
violence ensued, leading to the murder of over twenty thousand Chinese inhabitants.
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After the massacre, the Spanish were mostly concerned with discovering if an invasion
from China was coming and in reestablishing their trading relationship with Chinese merchants
from Fujian.157 China never launched an attack on Luzon, and soon after the massacre, Chinese
workers began settling once again on the island of Luzon. The Spanish government believed that
the massacre was necessary in order to maintain control over Manila. The colonial government
never pursued nor punished the European leaders in charge during the massacre. Since there
were no dire consequences after the massacre for the Spanish, the use of violence became an
accepted policy when they felt threatened. Consequently, subsequent massacres of the Chinese in
Manila occurred in 1639, 1662, 1686, and 1762-1764.158 It is important to recognize that the
Spanish fear of potential Chinese invasion was legitimate and serious throughout the second half
of the seventeenth century. After Chinese leaders under Koxinga brutally captured Dutch
fortifications in Taiwan, the Spanish feared that their settlements in Luzon were next.159
However, these much-feared Chinese invasions of Luzon never materialized. The Spanish
consistently and repeatedly resorted to deadly violence to control the Chinese inhabitants of
Manila. Given the success of their reign of violence over the Chinese, the Spanish seemed to
have no inclination to establish or maintain an atmosphere of peaceful collaboration with the
Chinese merchants.
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Differences in Spanish and Dutch Use of Violence
European powers in both Manila and Batavia had similar encounters with established
Chinese communities and trading networks when they arrived in the islands of Southeast Asia.
The Spanish and Dutch had to regulate and form policies in regard to the large Chinese merchant
communities who lived in the two cities. The Spanish used violence on numerous occasions
against Chinese merchants starting just thirty years after the establishment of Manila and
segregated the Chinese community into separate settlements from other ethnic groups. Under
similar circumstances, the Dutch chose to pursue a strikingly different path striving to maintain
an economic relationship with a Chinese merchant community that was allowed to settle within
the city walls of Batavia and enjoyed privileges that were not given to indigenous Javans. The
Dutch certainly sought to assert their authority over Chinese merchants through the levying of
heavy and burdensome taxes and required Chinese residents to register with the authorities.
Nonetheless, despite these restrictive and controlling measures, the Dutch did not resort to
violence in response to the influx of Chinese immigrants, even though the Dutch sailors and
commanders of the VOC were no strangers to violence. For over a century, the Dutch responded
with peaceful forms of regulation.
This time of peace and cooperation between these trading partners was eventually
disrupted by a Dutch massacre of the Chinese inhabitants of Batavia in 1740. But in comparison
to the repeated use of violence by the Spanish toward the Chinese residents of Manila, the Dutch
massacre in Batavia was atypical of the policies the Dutch pursued for over a century. The
Chinese massacre of 1740 was an anomaly for the Dutch trading Company in their response to
Chinese inhabitants. A closer look into the tensions leading up to the massacre is necessary to
better understand this anomalous event.

54

CHAPTER 4 THE BATAVIA MASSACRE OF 1740

Since the establishment of Batavia, the Dutch had generally viewed Chinese merchants as
assets who contributed to the success of the city and the inter-archipelago trade. The Chinese
were instrumental in building Batavia: they were involved in financial and economic matters as
well as in aiding in the crucial role of bringing products from China to Batavia. Many Chinese
merchants lived within the city walls with the Dutch. For over a century, this mutually beneficial
trading relationship between the VOC and Chinese merchants helped Batavia thrive as a major
trading center in Southeast Asia. In addition to living within the city wall, thousands of people of
other ethnic groups lived in the Ommelanden (suburbs or the surrounding area). Ethnic Chinese
and Javanese composed a majority of its population. After the peace treaty with Banten in 1683,
the Ommelanden attracted many immigrants.160 Initially, the VOC offered incentives to Chinese
citizens to farm in the Ommelanden. Some incentives included “an exemption of poll tax,
guaranteed purchase of products by the Company, and the establishment of minimum prices.”161
This development coincided with the establishment of the sugar industry creating an influx of
people in Batavia’s surrounding area.

Change in Batavia and the Ommelanden
In the years leading up to the massacre, the Ommelanden became unstable due to several
factors. One important factor was the decline of the VOC, which some historians date to as early
as 1690. A second factor was the growth of the sugar industry in the Ommelanden. As Blussé
notes, “This period coincides with a strong development in the sugar culture, an overwhelming
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immigration of Chinese laborers, the waning political influence of the Chinese Captain among
his own people, and increasing corruption.”162 Third, economic difficulties resulted in high
numbers of unemployed Chinese people who began threatening the Ommelanden, and eventually
Batavia itself. This confluence of a variety of factors contributed to the massacre. In this new
environment, the Dutch pursued a violent policy that ran counter to over a century of precedent.
But this policy shift proved an anomaly as the arrest and sentencing by the Heeren XVII of the
Dutch official responsible for the massacre demonstrates. The massacre occurred because Dutch
officials in Java faced a deteriorating local situation and chose to use force in an effort to address
the crisis, but it did not reflect a broader change of policy by the VOC leadership in the Dutch
Republic.

Chinese Kapitein System
The Chinese made up a significant percentage of the population in Batavia; as a result, in
1619 the VOC created institutions that were run by Chinese leaders. This system was known as
the kapitan or kapitein (Dutch for captain) system. It was not a Dutch innovation. The
Portuguese first implemented a similar structure in Melaka in 1511.163 The kapitein system in
Batavia was “an intermediary system and a product of the indirect rule as it provided a
convenient link between the immigrant Chinese communities and the colonial and indigenous
authorities.”164 So Bing Kong, the first kapitein in Batavia, was appointed by Governor-General
Jan Pieterszoon Coen and served for seventeen years. He held considerable power, presiding
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over economic matters that affected the Chinese community such as collecting taxes and other
civil matters.165 An important responsibility of the kapitein was to regulate the Chinese and other
foreigners in Batavia, while serving as the mediator between the VOC and these populations.166
The hierarchical structure of the system in Batavia differed from other areas because it
considered the Chinese kapitein more important than Dutch majors, lieutenants, and sergeants.167
The VOC relied on the economic activities of the Chinese community and thus valued the role of
the Chinese kapitein in the colonial administration of Batavia.
The status of the Chinese captain in relation to other colonial officials in Batavia shows
that the Chinese were more highly esteemed and had more rights than other ethnic groups. Their
privileged place in the colony was also evident in Dutch policies that allowed the Chinese
community to establish their own settlements inside and outside of the city. The demand for
Chinese workers in the Ommelanden increased as the sugar industry grew.168 The increased
demand for sugar often prompted Chinese workers to buy land in the Ommelanden. Chinese
traders of sugar and arrack, an alcoholic drink derived from sugar, became very wealthy, which
attracted large numbers of Chinese laborers to the Ommelanden to participate in the same
industry. The Chinese population doubled between 1680 and 1740, by which time they greatly
outnumbered the Dutch and were the second largest ethnic group in Batavia after the Javanese.169
It was this rapid growth in numbers that came to concern the Dutch authorities.
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Dutch Control through Hoofdgeld or Poll Tax
The VOC was able to maintain a profitable trading company by tapping into existing
Chinese commercial networks. The two groups complemented each other and recognized the
mutual need for one another. Since this arrangement was lucrative to the Company, they strove
to maintain this relationship of cooperation. However, the burgeoning influx of the Chinese
population concerned the VOC. The Dutch considered Chinese merchants subjects but they
feared that they might take over; so they instituted taxation and registration policies that asserted
their authority, but they refrained from violence that might threaten or disrupt the trade.
The Dutch embraced a long tradition of using taxation as a means of asserting authority
and control over a population. Their primary tool was a monthly tax that every Chinese resident
had to pay in order to secure a license or hoofdbriefje. The poll tax or hoofdgeld was introduced
around 1620, early in the colony’s history. It initially required the payment of one and a half
rials a month in order to be exempted from serving in the local militia and to supply the
necessary funds for strengthening the security of the fort.170 The Chinese had to present the
license each month to prove they had paid the poll tax. Written by an anonymous Chinese author
around 1794, The Chinese Annals of Batavia provides a Chinese perspective, albeit an elite one,
on this tax. While many historians write about the oppressive and destructive nature of the poll
tax on the Chinese inhabitants, the Chinese Annals depict the poll tax in more positive terms
noting that “all the Chinese happily observed” the tax because they received privileges and
exemptions in return.171 While some Chinese probably resented the tax, other inhabitants, as
reflected in the Annals, apparently felt more positive about these regulations because they
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recognized the freedom and economic advantages that they experienced, something other ethnic
groups in Java did not have.
The poll tax was expanded after free-burghers (Dutch inhabitants of Batavia who were
not employees of the VOC) complained to the States-General in Holland in 1647 and 1652 that
the Chinese received more privileges than they did.172 The free-burghers were restricted from
many aspects of trade by the Company while the Chinese benefited economically from the interarchipelago and overseas trade. The poll tax was established to document Chinese citizens as
well as extract the Chinese wealth. The Chinese inhabitants in Batavia were the only group that
had to pay a poll tax, but they enjoyed certain privileges in return. The economic partnership
these Chinese traders and merchants had with the VOC made them very wealthy. These
privileges are evident in the great economic opportunities the Chinese merchants enjoyed and in
the rights the Chinese had by living inside the city walls. The Chinese Annals provide an
additional example of these privileges. The author writes,

But the Dutch books differ from Chinese works; and by giving up their own doctrines
and teaching those of China, the Western people showed that they were willing to
conform to the wishes of the people, and showed tolerance and cordiality towards
strangers. The establishment of the free school, the orphanage and the hospital, all were
very beneficial for our Tang people [in Batavia].173
The Chinese were given their own institutions such as hospitals and schools, something the
Javanese inhabitants were not given. Though the Chinese were heavily taxed, they did reap some
substantial benefits from the taxation in conjunction with their partnership with the Dutch
Company, as the perspective of the Chinese Annals demonstrates.
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Instability and Corruption in the Ommelanden
In the years leading up to 1740, the Ommelanden became a dangerous and corrupt place
due to a number of factors. The first major issue was illegal immigration. Many Chinese entered
the Ommelanden without registering with the VOC or the Chinese kapitein. This was
problematic for the Dutch authorities because they could not tax these people or regulate them. A
second issue involved large groups of Chinese who had no permanent homes and who instead
moved around the countryside robbing or stealing as they went.174 The situation became so
dangerous that many inhabitants were too frightened to leave their homes at night. By 1713 some
of these bands numbered as many as one hundred fifty, and they made the Ommelanden and
Batavia perilous and unsafe.175 Though these roving bands of Chinese seriously threatened
Batavia and VOC authority, the Dutch opted to respond as they had in the past with nonviolent
policies toward the Chinese community designed to maintain their authority but not jeopardize
the lucrative trading relationship.
As early as the end of the seventeenth century, the VOC passed a number of policies that
aimed to minimize illegal Chinese immigration. On May 21, 1690 the Company stated that any
Chinese person that arrived in Batavia after 1683 had to report to the Chinese kapitein stating
their name, occupation, number of people in their household including slaves, how long they had
lived here, and the purpose of their residency.176 This was an early VOC attempt to forcefully,
yet peacefully, regulate the growing illegal Chinese population. It is important to note that,
despite the threat the Dutch felt from the influx of illegal immigration and their frustration in
trying to mitigate this threat, they did not resort to violence. Instead, they opted for a nonviolent,
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albeit restrictive, alternative. Though this policy seemed to work initially, it eventually became
ineffective. Therefore, almost four decades later in 1727 the VOC implemented another
immigration and safety policy that excluded new Chinese inhabitants from the outer regions of
Batavia. Those Chinese who could not produce their permission ticket or had been admitted into
Batavia within the last ten to twelve years were to be sent back to China.177 This policy aimed at
limiting the number of roving criminals in Batavia and the Ommelanden. Admittedly, this was a
very coercive and restrictive response of the Dutch to an increasingly threatening situation, but it
was not a violent response. Once again, instead of resorting to violent means of controlling a
large and unruly Chinese population, the VOC opted for a policy of registration and deportation,
which shared significant similarities with policies regulating the Chinese community over the
previous century.
The 1727 policy proved no more successful than previous measures the VOC had taken
to reign in Chinese migrants. The record books documented that twelve hundred Chinese
workers registered with the Dutch upon arrival, but that there were also numerous Chinese who
came to Batavia illegally by June 12, 1736.178 The Dutch were particularly concerned with
regulating the illegal immigration of Chinese workers because Batavia and the surrounding area
were overpopulated, resulting in a very high rate of unemployment. Overpopulation and high
unemployment contributed to the dangerous Chinese mobs that were destabilizing the area.
Wanting to prevent a serious conflict with these Chinese wanderers, the Dutch responded with a
policy similar to that of 1727. This new policy stated that all Chinese citizens that had been in
Batavia since 1729 must come forward and turn themselves in if they did not have a proper
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permission letter. In essence, this was an offer of amnesty to the illegal Chinese. They were
summoned to report in so that they could be added as legal subjects of the colony by the Higher
Government. They would need to pay a tax in order to receive this permission letter; if they
failed to do so, they would be returned to China.179 The permission letter served a dual purpose
because it ensured that Chinese inhabitants were taxed as well as monitored by the VOC or
Chinese captain. As we have already seen, for over a century the Dutch had used taxation to
regulate the Chinese community. By the 1730s, however, the challenges of governing a growing
Chinese population had made these policies less effective than in the past.

Economic Factors
VOC management of the sugar trade contributed to the disruption and instability in the
Ommelanden and threatened Batavia. While the sugar trade thrived in the seventeenth century, in
the eighteenth demand for Javanese sugar decreased. Nonetheless, the Heeren XVII continued to
promote sugar production even as the VOC reduced prices for sugar.180 Lower demand and
falling prices led to the bankruptcy of several sugar plantation owners. Due to their control over
the export and prices of sugar, the VOC was directly responsible for much of the crisis in the
sugar industry, even if some plantation owners made poor business decisions that further harmed
their enterprises.181 The economic burdens that bankruptcy produced proved to be too much for
many Chinese citizens. “As sugar mills were closed down due to the crisis on the sugar-market
and the erosion of the soil, the river irrigation system fell into decay and roving bands of
unemployed coolies started to render the countryside unsafe,” explicates Blussé.182 Elite Chinese
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sources also documented the behavior of these dangerous people. In the Chinese Annals, it was
reported,

The people lacked ways to make a living; they loafed about and wandered around doing
nothing, and made the daily consumption of opium their work. It got so bad that swarms
of robbers sprang up everywhere. In the countryside, raiders grouped together and robbed
and hurt people’s lives. All the robbers that were caught were Chinese who had not paid
the Dutch poll tax.183
This eyewitness account by an elite Chinese resident of Batavia demonstrates the divide between
the wealthy Chinese merchants who benefitted from the VOC and the impoverished Chinese
laborers of the Ommelanden. At least some of the Chinese elite recognized the danger that the
impoverished Chinese posed to Batavia. These unemployed laborers and the growing issue of
illegal Chinese immigrants contributed to the unrest and threatening uprisings that increasingly
worked to undermine the relationships in and around Batavia.

Corruption
Corruption was perhaps the most serious and destructive issue in Batavia’s surrounding
area. The Ommelanden were considered to be rough and lawless because only two sheriffs were
appointed to keep law and order in these expansive territories.184 These sheriffs did not possess
sufficient authority or support to maintain order. As a result, the VOC’s officials grew
increasingly corrupt and deceitful. Over time even the kapitein’s authority over his people
deteriorated. The cooperation that existed in this area dissolved, as corruption among the Chinese
leaders and Dutch officers dissipated the trust that existed between groups. Ni Hoe-kong was the
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kapitein of Batavia during the time before and during the massacre, and there were significant
factors that created a decline in his authority. A group of unethical moneylenders manipulated
many Chinese in the Ommelanden. Ni Hoe-kong was not trusted and did not handle this
problem, and when other problems arose he did not provide any assistance. When he had the
opportunity to show benevolence to his people by paying the poll taxes of bankrupt Chinese
inhabitants, he deserted them.185 Many Chinese merchants considered Ni Hoe-kong to be an
unworthy Chinese leader who neglected his people in their time of need.
The perspective represented in the Chinese Annals also recorded the lack of integrity that
Ni Hoe-kong, also known as Lian Fuguang, displayed when it mattered the most. Ni Hoe-kong
often argued and fought with his lieutenants, and many believed that he could not be an effective
leader for his people. While several Dutch officials committed crimes that financially benefitted
themselves, the author of the Annals accused Ni Hoe-kong of equivalent crimes by submitting to
them.186 He also asserted that many Chinese resented the kapitein because of his obsequious
behavior and his own self-indulgent habits. He and other lieutenants were too busy partying and
living lavish lifestyles to notice the unemployment and reckless behaviors of his charges.
Representing a strain of elite Chinese opinion in 1739, the Chinese Annals argued, “In hard times
the Chinese captain should be the shepherd of the people. But he showed no empathy for the
people’s sorrow.”187 The kapitein’s lack of control and corruption only fueled the tensions and
instabilities of the Ommelanden. He had little authority in the area, and he failed to lead a large
and unruly population. The author of the Annals believed that the kapitein should have paid for
the permits of the Chinese that could not afford them,188 which would have saved countless
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Chinese lives. When these tensions finally led to revolts and violence a few months later, Ni
Hoe-kong was accused of standing idly by as his countrymen were slaughtered. In 1775 when Ni
Hoe-kong died, many Chinese merchants still blamed the kapitein for their misfortunes. The
Chinese author of the Annals condemned him by saying, “If one million people were plunged
into misery, this was all because this captain failed to protect the people and take responsibility.
He deserves punishment by Heaven.”189 To show their disgust with him, some elite Chinese
believed Ni Hoe-kong deserved the burial rights of the poor.190
Before these issues erupted, the Chinese and Dutch lived in cooperation in Batavia for
over a century. They created a mutually beneficial relationship in which the VOC established a
monopoly on trade between Batavia and Europe, and Chinese merchants thrived economically
and financially by supplying this trade with Asian goods. Tensions and economic hardships
disrupted this status quo. Illegal immigration greatly increased the number of roaming Chinese
workers in the Ommelanden, causing disturbances and violence. The economic hardships
brought on by the closing of the sugar mills only intensified this dilemma. Some of the Dutch
and even Chinese officials were so corrupt and self-indulgent that they offered no aid or
solutions to the problems of the people in the surrounding area. As Chinese uprisings and revolts
began to threaten Batavia, the Dutch implemented taxation and regulatory policies to try to
regain control of the region. At a certain point, though, the conflicts escalated to a boiling point
in Batavia. Pushed to the breaking point, the Dutch exploded into violence in their response to
the Chinese threat. As a result was the massacre of 1740.
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Violence and Orders leading up to the Massacre
In order to reduce and better regulate the number of undocumented Chinese, the Dutch
passed policies that stated that roaming Chinese without permits would be sent to China or
Ceylon, where they were often employed in sugar mills.191 This had historically been a peaceful
policy, but it turned violent in July 1740 when a number of permit-less Chinese exiles were not
allowed to disembark in Ceylon, and instead were thrown overboard.192 Most of the laborers
drowned, but those who survived returned to the Ommelanden and told of the horrors of the
event. The author of the Chinese Annals recorded that on the night before the massacre the Dutch
General Van Imhoff “issued an order to send to sea and drown at night all the Chinese people
who had been rounded up outside the town on the sugar plantations and inside the town.”193 This
order was following the same technique of violence as the July incident. This disastrous event
fueled Chinese resistance against corrupt Chinese officials and Dutch authority in the
Ommelanden. A group of about five thousand Chinese men stood in opposition to the Dutch. The
ensuing revolts threatened the VOC, as the Chinese began attacking Batavia and burning villages
in the Ommelanden.194 The Dutch, who feared a conspiracy of cooperation among Chinese
citizens who lived within the city of Batavia, resorted to violence against this group. As Chinese
insurgents flooded the city, the Dutch responded by deploying its military forces against the
Chinese inside Batavia and in the Ommelanden.195 By the time the attack was over, thousands of
Chinese in Batavia and its surrounding area had been killed.
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What began as a loose association of rootless and largely unemployed Chinese laborers in
the Ommelanden eventually formed into a strong group of rebels that was able to effectively
surround the city.196 On Friday, October 7, 1740 there were rumors that the Chinese were going
to attack Batavia from both inside and outside of the city walls. The violence and turmoil in the
Ommelanden began to impact the Chinese inside the city. On that same day, when a group of
roughly five hundred armed Chinese rebels attacked a Dutch post, the Dutch were convinced a
revolt from within Batavia was imminent.197 Rumors of a conspiracy spread through Batavia like
wildfire and seriously fueled the paranoia and fear of the residents of the city. When the Dutch
heard of these rebels and their attacks, they decided to strike back.
The Dutch responded by restricting the movements of Chinese living within Batavia. On
October 8, the Dutch authorities became suspicious of the Chinese inhabitants because they were
removing their wives and children from the city. The Dutch, believing this restlessness was a
sign of a collaborative uprising in support of the rebels, forbade Chinese men from entering the
city.198 A second Dutch order authorized the killing of any Chinese person who passed the
guards outside the city and refused to give up their arms or resisted in any way.199 This order was
a direct response to the violence and terror in the Ommelanden. The Dutch then imposed further
restrictions, including a strict curfew that required all Chinese inhabitants of the city to remain
inside their homes after 6:30 pm and to keep their doors closed. They were warned that anyone
outside after curfew would be shot.200 Governor-General Adriaan Valckenier wrote a letter to the
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Heeren XVII on October 31, 1740, describing these events leading up to the massacre in detail.
Valckenier reported,

These movements could only be expected to create very dangerous consequences.
Consequently, we did not allow the Chinese to enter with any troops, nor did we tolerate
the departure of the Chinese people and children from this city. Moreover, learning that
the Chinese wanted to commit all kinds of hostilities, we ordered that anyone who would
not willingly put down their weapons would be shot down. We patrolled the city walls
with guns, a sergeant, a corporal, and eighteen European soldiers.201
This order pertained to all Chinese people living within the city walls of Batavia. The letter
demonstrates that Governor-General Valckenier felt that these restrictive orders were necessary
to control what he considered to be the dangerous Chinese inhabitants of the city.
While these increasingly restrictive orders were implemented, Chinese officials placed a
warning on every Chinese door. It explained that these restrictive orders by the VOC were “not a
pardon for life, but it was meant to eradicate all families! ‘If you Chinese are good people, this is
cheating. How abominable! Then you should close the doors and stay indoors.’ Just like sitting
ducks awaiting death! ‘At night don’t go outside, otherwise the soldiers that patrol at night may
mistakenly kill people without blame’.”202 Many Chinese people believed this strange warning
and stayed indoors. They later decided that this order was a trick to frighten the Chinese in
Batavia and to keep them from revolting. Meanwhile, the VOC continued to implement strict

201

J.K.J. De Jonge and Marinus Lodewijk van Deventer, eds., De Opkomst Van Het Nederlandsch Gezag in OostIndie: Verzameling van Onuitgegeven Stukken uit het Oud-Koloniaal Archief, Vol 9 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1877), 302, https://archive.org/details/deopkomstvanhet04devegoog/page/n503. Author’s translation of “deze
bewegingen niet dan zeer gevaarlyke gevolgen te verwagten waren, hebben goedgedagt de Chinesen met geen
troepen in te laten, noch ook niet te gedoogen het vertrek ven derzelver wijven en kinderen uyt deze stad en
daarenboven op de gedane berigten van den drossaart Vink, dat de Chinesen allerhande hostiliteyten kwamen te
plegen, verstaan allen van natie, die niet gewilliglyk hare wapens, welken zy by haar mogten hebben op bevel
kwamen neder te leggen sonder aensien voor den kop te doen schieten, mitsgaders rondom de stad binnen het
geschut en de hekken te laten patrouilleren, met een zergeant, een corporaal en 18 Europeese soldaten."
202
Blussé and Dening, The Chinese Annals of Batavia, 126.

68

orders. The last measure the Dutch took to prevent an uprising was stripping the Chinese of all
weapons, even small knives.203 Evidently, the fears of a revolt prompted the Dutch to take drastic
measures to control the Chinese inhabitants inside the city walls.

Chinese Massacre of 1740
As the night of attacks outside the walls concluded, the morning of October 9 dawned
and violence ensued. The Dutch leaders instructed Dutch soldiers to ransack Chinese homes and
to murder Chinese inhabitants. Especially people who arrived on newly docked ships were
encouraged to participate. Describing the proceeding situation, Dharmowijono stated that “the
following day, the government (VOC) brought all the ships to Batavia and instructed the people
on the ships together with the soldiers and Christian citizens to murder all the Chinese males,
both young and old.”204 Aiding the Dutch was an armed indigenous Javanese population, who
became known as the “mob” and was motivated by years of hatred and jealousy toward the
Chinese. Dutch officials summoned the indigenous peoples and told them “’For good or ill,
extirpate the Chinese people and achieve great merit. The Company will certainly reward you!’
When the various indigenous peoples heard this order, they called up their people in droves,
mastered their courage, and fought in the vanguard and attacked the Chinese.”205 Aided by the
mob, the Dutch and other Europeans murdered the Chinese inhabitants, plundering and burning
Chinese homes. In a letter to the Heeren XVII, Governor-General Valckenier described the
groups who were recruited to sustain the massacre: “On the eleventh of this month men were

203

Kemasang, “How Dutch Colonialism Foreclosed a Domestic Bourgeoisie in Java,” 73; Kemasang, “Overseas
Chinese in Java,” 137.
204
Dharmowijono, “Van Koelies, Klontongs en Kapiteins,” 296. Author’s translation of “De volgende dag riep het
Gouvernement al zijn schepen naar Batavia en instrueerde het bootvolk om samen met soldaten en christelijke
inheemsen alle Chinezen van het mannelijk geslacht, jong en oud, te vermoorden.”
205
Blussé and Dening, The Chinese Annals of Batavia, 128.

69

ordered to use the Blacks who were walking armed along the streets since the order of the
massacre was given. This order was also given to the soldiers, artisans, and seafarers who played
an enormous role in plundering houses and taking possessions.”206 With the aid of these people,
the Company had a large force to attack the Chinese inside and outside of the city.
The Chinese in the Ommelanden continued to attack the Company’s forts throughout the
surrounding region while violence also persisted inside the city. A report from a fort at
Tangerang in the Ommelanden warned that a Chinese rebel group consisting of about three
thousand men was attacking various ports and was heading toward Batavia.207 The Company
sent European and indigenous troops to defend these valuable forts. On October 12 the Company
sent troops to combat the rebel Chinese east of the city. Though the Company lost two valuable
cannons, they reported that a large number of Chinese rebels were killed and that the others fled
the area.208 Though the VOC was able to quell some of the rebels, the attacks continued. Dutch
commanders in the Ommelanden reported that some Javanese and over two thousand Chinese
came from the area of Anke to attack Batavia. This violent group burned and killed everything
with which they came in contact.209 The next day the Company sent seventy-two grenadiers,
thirty civilian riders, and two hundred baliers, equipped with guns to Fort Anke to combat these
rebels.210 Even after the massacre ended in Batavia on October 22, opposition by the Chinese and
violence from both sides continued in the Ommelanden.
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It is important to note that, while the Chinese groups who were revolting in the
Ommelanden were armed and dangerous, the Chinese in Batavia had taken no action against the
Dutch and largely complied with orders to stay indoors. Nonetheless, the Dutch were consumed
with paranoia and took their fears out on the Chinese within the city. No one was safe or exempt
from the violence when the soldiers went into the homes of the Chinese residents and began
killing people. “No matter whether they were men or women, old or young, they were pulled
outside and killed. The cries of the voices were unbearable to the ear,” describes the anonymous
Chinese Annals.211 There were Chinese citizens who tried to defend themselves when they
realized their precarious situation, but these smaller uprisings were also quelled. The Dutch
began using cannons in addition to small arms to attack the Chinese. The Chinese had no place to
go as the death toll steadily increased. A Chinese eyewitness recounts, “The survivors ran for
their lives scattering in four directions towards the mountains. Some of them ran towards the
mountain cliffs, and others hid in the innermost [parts] of empty houses; they were murdered by
the native soldiers. Jade and stone [people high and low] were burned together! Heartbreaking
and pitiful to the eye this was!”212 Once the massacre was underway, there was no stopping it
and few people were spared. Even Chinese prisoners and patients in the hospital were killed.213
VOC troops controlled the city walls preventing escape.214 For the two weeks that the massacre
endured, an estimated ten thousand Chinese were killed.
Governor-General Valckenier described the horrible events of the massacre in his letter to
the Heeren XVII written on October 31, explaining that “the Chinese, as well as the slaves of the
residents, both inside the walls and in the suburbs began to be killed in a general massacre. This
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was done without the interdiction of the Governor-General, and without any restraint being
exercised by him in the occurring events.”215 Though it is unclear who ordered the massacre of
the Chinese in Batavia, Governor-General Valckenier pointedly did not take credit for ordering
the killings. Instead he merely reported that the massacre occurred. He goes on to describe, “A
very fierce fire arose in the afternoon among the houses standing on the East side of the great
river on the bazar, which subsequently spread to different places of the city and lasted two to
three days, eventually spreading to the point of threatening to devour the warehouses of the
Company on the Anker harbor.”216 Again, his reporting of the events was vague and did not
actively state who the people were that participated in the destruction of the town. Valckenier
then described intensifying violence across the town:

On Sunday, the massacre became more and more intense, so much that within twentyfour hours the west side of the city was swallowed by the flashy fire. From the ninth to
the twelfth of this month, other Chinese houses in the city were ignited in flames without
any attempt to extinguish them. An estimated six hundred to seven hundred houses were
destroyed inside and outside of the city wall.217
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The Governor-General does not elaborate by providing any estimate of the death toll. However,
his report does paint a vivid picture of the progression of the violence that occurred within the
city walls.
The Chinese kapitein also witnessed the massacre inside Batavia, but he did not warn his
people of the Dutch attack or intercede for them. Instead, he fled to the castle to seek protection
for himself, but when Dutch soldiers opened fire on him he escaped to the house of a Dutch
friend who later turned him over to the authorities. 218 Valckenier adds to this account when he
noted, “The Captain of the Chinese Nie Hoe-kong during the before mentioned massacre,
dressed up in women’s garments trying to escape. When this became known to us, he was
arrested and detained, which was not usual for Chinese working with the Company.”219 The
behavior of the Chinese captain only added to the distrust many Chinese felt toward their
captain. Nie Hoe-kong remained in jail until the uprisings subsided. In the Chinese Annals the
author speaks very negatively of the Chinese captain. However, Captain Ni Hoe-kong found
himself in a precarious situation during the massacre, and it is difficult to interpret from the
Chinese Annals and VOC sources the options he had and the motives behind his decisions. As a
high official who worked as mediator between the Dutch and Chinese inhabitants, he was caught
in the middle of the two groups when the massacre erupted. It must be recognized that Captain
Ni Hoe-kong served as a convenient scapegoat for the Chinese merchants who aimed to
reestablish the lucrative trading relationship with the VOC in the years following the massacre.
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German Accounts of the Massacre
There were other Europeans in addition to the Dutch who witnessed and participated in
the massacre. German travelers were eyewitnesses who wrote detailed accounts of the massacre,
demonstrating that the violent event had a significant impact on their experiences in Southeast
Asia. One such traveler was Johann Wolfgang Heydt, who wrote an account about the massacre
including his opinion about the causes of it. His specialty of mapmaking brought him to Batavia,
and this gave him a high social status there. Though he did not personally participate in the
massacre, Heydt believed the Chinese got what they deserved. This condemning attitude toward
the Chinese reflects the negative attitude that existed toward the Chinese by many Javanese and
Europeans throughout Batavia. He explained that the wealthy Chinese in Batavia were all
connected by openings in their houses, demonstrating that the Chinese were collaborating to
attack the Dutch.220 Though it is uncertain if these claims were true, this demonstrates the sort of
rumors that may have led Europeans to believe the Chinese were planning an uprising within
Batavia. Consequently, Heydt believed the Chinese townspeople were to blame for the uprising
and the resulting massacre.
Another German eyewitness was Georg Bernhardt Schwarz, who actively participated in
the massacre. Schwarz was a barrel-maker from Wurttemberg, Germany who moved to the
Netherlands to sign on with the trading company as a soldier.221 It was not unusual for men
without special qualifications to sign with the Company. Schwarz arrived in Batavia in May
1735, and he quickly learned to make a living working with a master-carpenter.222 At the end of
his travel accounts he describes the massacre of the Chinese. Schwarz explains that he and other
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sailors were instructed to kill all Chinese in the town. Carpenters especially were told to enter
homes and destroy property and murder the Chinese, due to their access to tools that could be
used as weapons.223 Like many others, he obeyed. Even after the city was in ruin with death all
around, Schwarz decided to plunder the town. He describes,

Since I knew that my neighbor had a fat pig, I wanted to capture it and bring it to my
house. When the master carpenter saw this, he hit me and said I should first kill the
Chinese and then rob them. I quickly grabbed a rice pounder and beat my neighbor, with
whom I’d sat and drank with, to death. Although I found it terrible, I had to work against
my will because my boss was watching. Then I went into a room and found a pistol. I
went on and killed with it all that I could. Once I killed two or three, I was so used to
killing and did not feel bad about it, that it did not matter if I killed a Chinese or a dog.224
Schwarz’s account reveals an initial reluctance to kill his Chinese neighbors, but this reluctance
was apparently short-lived, and he quickly moved on to murder many. Nowhere in his account
does Schwarz express remorse for participating in the massacre. He continued to kill, plunder,
and steal throughout Batavia. Though he was later arrested, it was due to the theft of tea, not for
the murder of the Chinese inhabitants.225 Schwarz’s account is valuable because it provides a
participant’s account from the perspective of a European who willingly participated in the
massacre.
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The perspective of Heinrich Schröder differs from the previous accounts because he
provides a perspective of the massacre in Batavia from a nearby city. Like many others, Schröder
believed the kapitein was conspiring with the rebels and was planning an attack against the
Dutch.226 While the massacre was unfolding in the city, Schröder was at his post in Tangerang.
Roughly three thousand Chinese had captured a sugar mill near Tangerang, so Schröder and
other soldiers had been dispatched to crush this insurgency. After a twenty-hour fight, most of
the Chinese rebels were captured with their riches and many were killed.227 Conditions were
difficult for the soldiers in the Ommelanden. Since the conflict had destroyed everything, food
was scarce and diseases ran rampant.228 Eventually, Schröder was instructed to depart for
Surabaya, but instead he made it to Semarang. In Semarang, the Chinese rebels had destroyed
rice fields and ransacked the city.229 Schröder’s account demonstrates that the revolts and
massacre in the area greatly devastated the people living in Java. It also provides a detailed
account of the warfare that continued after the massacre throughout Java between the Chinese,
Javanese, and the VOC.
The most vivid sources describe thousands of dead bodies lying in canals and ditches
around Batavia, like the Chinese Annals which reports, “Dead bodies blocked the doors; their
blood flowed into the ditches and canals.”230 All sources agree that the massacre killed
thousands. The Dutch who had lived in cooperation with their fellow Chinese citizens for a
century ended up murdering their neighbors en masse. In the Dutch Republic, painters and poets
examined this heinous event in their works. The poet W. van Haren wrote in 1742 that “Java’s
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stream, that earlier flowed so softly and mildly through its regions, erupted into a fierce torrent
through the land, vomiting the dead into the terrified sea.”231 Figure 1 shows an illustration by
painter J. Van Schley that displays Chinese houses on fire and hundreds of dead bodies flowing
in the river.232 Everywhere observers recognized the scope and brutality of the massacre.

Figure 1. The murder of Chinese in Batavia and the burning of the city.
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Unique Collaborative Environment
For over a century before the massacre, the Dutch had relied on Chinese merchants who
facilitated trade, Chinese laborers who worked in farming and construction, and Chinese
entrepreneurs who owned sugar mills, artisan’s workshops and retail establishments. As early as
1619 the Dutch recognized the importance of living in close proximity with the Chinese, so they
designed the city to have “a carre-shaped fort and for a city surrounded by a moat, for protection
of the Chinese inhabitants and others who would like to establish themselves under Company
protection."233 Even the strategic building of the trading post in Batavia reflects the importance
of the cohabitation of the Dutch and Chinese. Since there were very few Dutch free-burghers in
Batavia and they wanted to protect the Chinese from outside attacks, the Dutch colonial city
differed greatly from other colonial cities in Southeast Asia.234 In other European colonies all
ethnic groups, including the Chinese, lived in separate towns outside of the city walls. In Batavia
the Dutch strove for convivencia or a peaceful coexistence with the Chinese. This collaborative
environment the VOC established in Batavia with the Chinese inhabitants was unusual for the
time, but it was something the Dutch were able to maintain for a hundred and twenty-one years.
Though the Dutch were guilty of large-scale savagery and violence against the Chinese during
the massacre of 1740, the massacre was an anomaly. It represented an uncharacteristic departure
from their long-standing practice of refraining from violent policies toward the Chinese
inhabitants of Batavia.
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Arrest of Governor Valckenier
The arrest and trial of the Dutch Governor-General Adriaan Valckenier for orchestrating
the massacre provides further evidence that the massacre represented an aberration rather than
marking a shift in VOC policy. Though ultimate responsibility for the massacre remains a
subject of debate, two prominent officials, Adriaan Valckenier and Gustaaf Willem Baron van
Imhoff, are the two figures who contemporaries identified as responsible. The two men were
related since their great grandmothers were sisters. This family tie, as well as differences in
character and the jealousy that existed between them, led to hatred and an unhealthy competition
between the two men.235 Both played significant roles in the coordination of the massacre.
Valckenier and van Imhoff not only organized the massacre in the Ommelanden, but they also
deployed other men to implement stricter measures inside the city walls.236 While Valckenier
was the one ultimately tried, his guilt in orchestrating the massacre has never been completely
proven.237 In fact, the author of the Chinese Annals blamed van Imhoff for the massacre,
consistently and repeatedly describing van Imhoff, who was the governor of Ceylon, as the “evil
king.”238 The Annals author displayed intense animosity toward van Imhoff since it was his
suggestion to send the Chinese to Ceylon. It was during this event that it was reported that the
Chinese were thrown overboard to drown.239 Many Chinese inhabitants believed that the events
that led up to the massacre stemmed from this event. Lin Cuipu, a Chinese official, argues that
van Imhoff should have received the blame because “innumerable lives were later killed by his
poisonous hand. Heaven let him come to Batavia to confuse the hearts of the great king and the
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councilors and the resulting disorder was an act of destiny!”240 Apparently, many Chinese
merchants believed that van Imhoff should have been arrested and sentenced for the massacre.
Valckenier clearly agreed with these Chinese eyewitnesses. Two months after the
massacre, he arrested van Imhoff and his councilors and sent them to Holland to be punished for
their crimes of insubordination.241 They were quickly cleared of these charges, and in turn, they
accused Valckenier of coordinating the massacre. Valckenier was arrested at Cape Town in
November 1741 and was sent back to Batavia to face his trial. He spent nearly a decade in prison
awaiting resolution to his case, but died on June 20, 1751 before his verdict could be read.242
Even though it was a complicated situation and it was difficult to determine who was truly to
blame for the massacre, the VOC still arrested and held the Governor-General responsible for the
violence that occurred during his rule. The very fact that Governor-General Adriaan Valckenier,
the Dutchman who was in power during the massacre, was actually tried for carrying out the
massacre demonstrates that the Dutch did not endorse, support, or tolerate a policy of violence in
Batavia. Even though the Batavia situation turned into a massacre of the Chinese, this was
deemed to be unacceptable and even “criminal” by the Dutch authorities in Europe, who indicted
and tried the high ranking official that they identified as responsible. The massacre was a truly
horrific event in Java’s history. It was not, however, a premeditated plan or strategy of the VOC
in their ongoing relationship with the Chinese. Instead, several political, economic, and social
factors coalesced together to break the long-standing cooperative coexistence of the Chinese and
Dutch in Batavia in a tragic and murderous way. The massacre was an unsanctioned act that was
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an aberration, and the VOC would strive to maintain a collaborative relationship with Chinese
merchants even in the midst of warfare on Java.
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CHAPTER 5 AFTER THE MASSACRE: VIOLENCE AND WAR

Regardless of any previous attempts to avoid violence during the period of 1619-1740,
the massacre dissolved any trust that may have existed between the Chinese and Dutch. It created
an atmosphere of violence throughout the island. In the nearly two decades that followed the
massacre, there were numerous violent conflicts between the Chinese, Dutch, and Javanese,
ending the cooperation that existed between these groups. The massacre ushered in a period of
warfare that would last seventeen years. Warfare typically marks a dramatic change in relations,
and this was the case in Java as well.

Ongoing Violence leading to War
Some Chinese merchants who survived the massacre remained in Batavia in hopes of
restoring the economic relationship with the Company, while other Chinese inhabitants of
Batavia and the Ommelanden fled east to Semarang to join the rebellion. This town had been
under the control of the Company since 1708, and it was an important European fortress. In this
central part of Java, the Chinese refugees from Batavia joined forces with other Chinese soldiers
and Javanese seeking revenge against the VOC and other elite.243 After the massacre, the high
officials of the Javanese court met to discuss how the Javanese should officially respond to the
outbreak of violence. Since the Javanese courts had long-standing alliances with the VOC, they
needed to determine if they wanted to continue to support the Company or join the rebellion.
However, the members of the court could not come to a unanimous decision, resulting in an
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impasse. In the political vacuum, many Javanese men sided with the Chinese before Pakubuwana
II finally made an official decision, creating a social-economic division among the Javanese
inhabitants. Even though the Dutch expected some support from their former allies, they became
distrustful of the Javanese and their ruler. Governor-General Valckenier suspected, “The
Javanese were not very trustworthy, and we wondered if they were conspiring with the
Chinese.”244 Though the Company harbored early suspicions of a conspiracy between the
Chinese and the Javanese court, they still hoped their Javanese allies would come to their aid.
The Company did not have a strong force prepared to defend its fortresses throughout
Central Java. By contrast, the Chinese forces were large and powerful by May 1741, with rebel
groups numbering in the thousands. Consequently, they were successful in plundering VOC
posts throughout Central Java. Governor-General Valckenier was worried about these strong
rebel forces, and he expressed this concern to the Heeren XVII. In the letter written on
November 6 Valckenier asked for permission to “publish an act of amnesty for the sake of
salvaging the good Chinese and to better facilitate the eradication of the hostile opposing
forces.”245 Evidently, the Dutch were fully aware that an impending war could pit an alliance of
elite Chinese, Javanese, and Europeans against rebels drawn primarily from the impoverished
inhabitants of the island.
The rebels began attacking VOC posts. Even with the request of more forces to help
defend the posts, the VOC and its allies remained an insignificant and weak army. The post at
Juwana, for example, had only fifteen men guarding it.246 On May 23 the post was easily
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attacked by a large group of over a thousand Chinese who killed half the occupants.247 The
Company, expecting a warning from the local population living in and around Juwana, were
completely blind-sided by this attack.248 After this surprise attack by this mixed group of Chinese
and Javanese rebels, the VOC became concerned about their port at Semarang. Since the garrison
at Semarang was small and weak, they summoned anyone they could find to help defend the city,
which created a dire situation in other ports, such as Demak. Even with reinforcements,
Semarang remained extremely vulnerable to rebel attacks. A powerful rebel army that numbered
over three thousand soldiers surrounded the city, which only had about 90 Europeans and 208
Indonesian soldiers to defend it.249 At this time, the VOC was still waiting anxiously for aid from
Pakubuwana II, but it never came. As rebel forces surrounded Semarang, the VOC attempted to
combat these strong opponents by sending a force of forty-six Europeans and one hundred fortysix Indonesians, many of whom were Javanese soldiers.250 Since the Company was still unaware
of the Javanese decision to side with the Chinese, they did not realize that this plan would never
be successful. Instead, most of the soldiers deserted and fled, and some artillery was lost before
the VOC soldiers returned to the fortress.251 The Chinese forces continued to dominate the VOC
troops around Semarang, eventually blockading the river and cutting off the source of fresh
water that flowed into the city.252 The situation seemed desperate. Though the Company’s forces
in Semarang were weak and ill, they were nonetheless able to maintain control over Semarang
throughout the summer of 1741.
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The large Chinese forces continued to surround and besiege the VOC posts throughout
the central north coast of Java, often plundering and damaging villages. The town of Rembang
was seriously threatened in July of 1741 when the Chinese forces attacked the post. The VOC
was unsuccessful in sending reinforcements to help protect the post, and the Chinese massacred
every European and Moorish sailor they encountered and seized the rich arsenal of cannons in
Rembang.253 By the end of July 1741 the Company no longer had any doubts about the position
Pakubuwana II had decided to take in this war because Javanese forces began attacking VOC
posts. Valckenier reported that the situation in Tegal was also grim. He wrote, “Matters there
worsened from day to day, and the residents had begun to doubt the loyalty of the Javanese, so
this day, not only were all European homes outside the town plundered and burned, but the
Company’s property and mills were also destroyed.”254 Pakubuwana II had officially joined the
Chinese rebels against the VOC, and his forces combined with the Chinese to destroy the
European posts throughout the region.
The only significant ally the VOC now had was Cakraningrat IV and his Madurese
forces. Cakraningrat IV allied himself with the VOC in order to rule independently under the
VOC, offering aid to the Company in order to disconnect himself from Kartasura and gain
control in East Java.255 The VOC agreed to this arrangement, and their combined forces quickly
went on the offensive. By November 1741 the VOC troops were still greatly outnumbered by the
Chinese and Javanese forces around Semarang. In a letter written on December 6 GovernorGeneral Johannes Thedens informed the Heeren XVII that Semarang was surrounded by 20,000

253

Ibid.
De Jonge and van Deventer, De Opkomst Van Het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indie, Vol 9, 381. Author’s
translation of “Dat de zaken aldaar van dag tot dag verergerden en hy gebragt was buyten den twyfel, omtrend de
vyandschap der Javanen, alzoo dezelve 's daags bevoorens niet alleen alle Europese huysen buyten de logie staande
geplundered en verbrand; maar ook 's Comps. thuyn met de moolen op Brebes.”
255
Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 91; Ricklefs, “The Crisis of 1740-1 In Java,” 280.
254

85

armed Javanese and 3,500 Chinese rebels who had thirty cannons aimed at the city.256
Nonetheless, the VOC was able to break the blockade and most of the enemy soldiers fled the
area.257 Throughout the rest of 1741 and 1742 the VOC reclaimed the other areas that were
threatened by the Chinese and Javanese. Meanwhile, Cakraningrat IV gained control over much
of East Java.258 As the VOC continued to defeat their opponents, Pakubuwana II realized his
mistake in breaking from the Company. Perceiving that his people were outraged about his
policies and that his kingdom faced the imminent threat of falling to Cakraningrat IV, he begged
the VOC for forgiveness.259 Though the VOC reluctantly accepted the apology and renewed the
alliance, this did not eliminate Pakubuwana II’s problems because the rebels were now more
anti-Pakubuwana II than anti-VOC and consisted more of Javanese rebels than Chinese.
Distrust between the various Javanese courts and the VOC continued for the next few
years. Cakraningrat IV continued to gain power over the region. In December 1742 his forces
took control of Kartasura and removed the rebels. Cakraningrat IV was adamant about wanting
to execute Pakubuwana II to serve as an example to other kings. The VOC, for its own economic
gain, opposed this policy and Cakraningrat IV reluctantly obeyed and returned Pakubuwana II to
the court.260 Even though the Chinese and Javanese Rebellion was defeated in 1743, the situation
in Java continued to be a complicated web of distrust and tentative alliances throughout the rest
of the 1740s. The VOC eventually changed their allegiance in 1744 and went to war against
Cakraningrat IV, who was defeated the following year. 261 Warfare continued to rage throughout
the region. Various wars of succession wracked the island. Princes and courtiers of Mataram
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fueled the rebel armies until 1757.262 When the heavy fighting finally came to an end, inland
Java was still divided between various Javanese courts and kings, while the VOC controlled
much of the coast.263 The heavy fighting that devastated the island after the massacre of 1740
greatly weakened the VOC. The massacre and the warfare that followed not only weakened the
alliances between various groups on the island, but it also left the VOC in what a modern
historian described as “an advanced state of incompetence, corruption and financial
difficulty.”264 The massacre of 1740 was a strong influential factor that sparked this time of
warfare. It is within this violent setting that the VOC also implemented heinous acts of brutality
to combat the enemy as a result of its circumstances.

Dutch Violence during the War
History is littered with examples of violence causing more violence, and Java in the
1740s fits this pattern. The deadly attacks on several VOC posts left the Company in a weak
military and political position that caused them to embrace violence as their central method of
combating the powerful Chinese rebellions throughout Java. The massacre that occurred in
Batavia in 1740 signaled change from the norm of how the VOC had previously interacted with
the Chinese in Batavia. The fear of a rebellion and other factors pushed the Company to resort to
violence, something that was not supported by the Heeren XVII. Consequently, the massacre of
1740 represented a significant catalyst to the conflicts and violence that spread throughout Java
in 1741. Finding themselves in a full-scale war, the VOC resorted to violence to defeat the strong
Chinese army and its Javanese supporters.
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In the midst of heavy attacks on VOC fortresses throughout the north central region of
Java, Governor-General Adriaan Valckenier wrote a letter on November 6, 1741 to the Heeren
XVII explaining the dire situation in which the Company found itself: “We were informed by the
Ministers by a letter of the 14th of June that Semarang was surrounded by the rebellious Chinese
and that they had taken their place of residence in the sugar mill of the captain of the
Chinese.”265 In response to this threat, the Company sent troops to defend the city against the
rebels’ attacks. Valckenier instructed that it would be beneficial “to spread the garrison to
Semarang with as much military personnel that they could spare, and also to send a number of
600 indigenous soldiers to the Cheribonsen country road to Semarang under the command of the
Bali Captain Ismael.”266 This was a strategic military response to the threat to this important city.
The VOC used as many Europeans and allied Javanese as they possibly could to combat the
Chinese and Javanese forces. Eventually, realizing that these actions were not enough, the
Governor General recognized that more violence was necessary to defend its ports from
destruction.
The rebel armies were a serious threat to the VOC throughout Java by 1741 because they
greatly outnumbered the Europeans at the various forts throughout northern Java. Seized with
panic about their difficult situation, Governor-General Valckenier opted for “a general massacre
of the Chinese in Semarang and throughout Java.”267 However, his opinion did not represent the
ideology of the other high officials of the VOC toward Chinese inhabitants. Though he believed
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such a sanguinary campaign would be helpful in their dire circumstances, a large-scale massacre
of the Chinese throughout Java did not materialize.268 They did, however, use violence while
protecting Semarang against the rebel Chinese. By November, European reinforcements from
other parts of the island were finally reaching Semarang, whose garrison now numbered over
three thousand VOC troops, not counting Cakraningrat IV and his Madurese allies.269 This
increase in military power enabled the Company to defend its fortress against its Chinese and
Javanese opponents. Similar to how the rebel armies terrorized and killed its opponents, the VOC
killed most of the Chinese rebels in the surrounding area.270 This violent action exhibits the
common use of violence that armies adopt during a period of war.
The only place where the VOC reported a massacre of the Chinese during this period was
in Surabaya. A few months before the retaliation of the VOC against the Chinese in Semarang,
the VOC fought against the Chinese around the post of Surabaya. The Chinese and their
Javanese allies plundered and burned all of the European homes,271 greatly threatening the
security of the Company throughout east Java. However, once the VOC received enough military
support, they quickly took a more aggressive approach. The events were briefly mentioned in
Valckenier’s November 6, 1741 letter to the Heeren XVII, where he reports, “The Surabaya
servants had witnessed the massacre of the Chinese people in that district and they had found all
sorts of war ammunition.”272 In areas such as Surabaya Cakraningrat IV played an influential
role in the violence because the soldiers he provided were key participants in the violence against
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the Chinese.273 Cakraningrat IV wanted to gain control over much of Java, so he had his own
reasons for clearing the eastern part of Java of the Chinese.274 In this time of war, the VOC found
it necessary to defend its fortresses, and they used violence without restraint.
The VOC was relieved and proud of these victories over the rebel Chinese in Java. On
November 25, 1741 an act was passed that added a “thanksgiving day for victories over the
rebellious Chinese at Semarang.”275 The Plakaatboek does not shed light on how this victory
materialized. It does demonstrate, however, the attitude of the generals toward the victory over
the powerful rebel armies. The events that occurred throughout the north central and eastern
parts of Java differed from events in Batavia. The rebellious Chinese were the enemies of the
VOC, and thus violence was employed by the VOC to defend its valuable forts throughout the
island. It is important to recognize that there was a relevant distinction between how the Chinese
merchants were treated in Batavia compared to the Chinese rebels throughout Java. These
Chinese elite, striving for a renewal of their lucrative trade relationships with the VOC,
celebrated the victory at Semarang with their trading partners.
It is significant to remember the context in which these violent acts occurred. By 1741 the
VOC was in a full-scale war that included the Chinese, Javanese, and Europeans. The November
6 letter addressed a few massacres that occurred by the hands of the Chinese rebels. For instance,
an August 17 report mentioned that a sailor, two people from Bali, and roughly three hundred
fifty Javanese were murdered by the Chinese.276 Warfare creates a setting where mass violence
runs rampant. It is in this context that violence toward the Chinese rebels became an accepted
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practice by members of the VOC. In this sense, it is important to note that while large scale
violence was not used by the VOC in Batavia before 1740 as a way of maintaining control of the
Chinese inhabitants, it became a common practice of war during the unstable period that
followed. The massacre of the Chinese in Batavia in 1740 precipitated a war throughout Java
where massacres were utilized to destroy the opposing side.
From the establishment of Batavia in 1619 until 1740 the VOC pursued a relationship of
cooperation with the Chinese in Batavia, refraining from violent policies toward the Chinese
inhabitants. The massacre that ensued due to various social and economic circumstances was
uncharacteristic of the policy that the Dutch sought and implemented in Batavia for a hundred
and twenty years. The period of warfare that followed the massacre of 1740 changed the
atmosphere of Java and the relationships between the inhabitants of the island. Violence became
common. But the Dutch did not simply declare an “open season” of massacres against all
Chinese in Java;277 instead, they only used violence in response to their Chinese opponents
during a time of active war. This context of war cannot be ignored. The violence performed by
the Dutch during the war was in response to the attacks on their valuable forts in places like
Semarang and Surabaya. Wartime violence cannot be compared to the unfortunate and
anomalous massacre of the Chinese in Batavia in 1740. The time of warfare created a change
that required violence to defend and regain control of territory. Nonetheless, despite the
surrounding context of war activities in and around Batavia, the official policies passed in regard
to the Chinese in Batavia after 1740 continue to show a glimpse of the collaborative
philosophical approach the Company had toward the Chinese for more than a hundred years.
Though the massacre had destroyed the trust and damaged the economic partnership between the
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groups, the VOC still sought to have an environment where the Dutch company and the
merchant Chinese could work together to mutually benefit both groups economically.

Policies in Batavia after the Massacre
Though the massacre changed the relationship between the wealthy Chinese merchants
and Europeans in Batavia, there is evidence that the VOC did continue to implement policies that
avoided violent coercion to control the merchant Chinese. The first policy the Company passed
after the massacre was an act of amnesty. Since the massacre was a response to the Chinese
rebellion that occurred in the Ommelanden of Batavia, the VOC passed an act of amnesty for the
Chinese of Batavia just days after the bloodshed occurred. This policy, which was passed on
October 22, 1740, provided amnesty to the Chinese people that attacked the city of Batavia
before and during the time of the massacre.278 The Chinese inhabitants that remained in Batavia
were pardoned of their roles in the rebellion. The VOC’s intent with this pardon was to alleviate
the tension that was left in Batavia between the survivors of the massacre and the Europeans. Of
course, they were also undoubtedly hoping to restore some of the economic trust and partnership
they had with the Chinese in the city as well. Governor-General Valckenier certainly had an
ulterior motive in passing the amnesty act because Chinese rebels continued to rise up
throughout Java to seek revenge for the massacre. Not only did the VOC want to restore the
strong economic ties with the Chinese of Batavia, but the Chinese were also granted amnesty in
hopes that they would fight in the imminent war against the Chinese rebels and their Javanese
supporters.
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Though the VOC had resorted to violence to quell the Chinese rebellion outside the city
walls, resulting in large-scale battles that led to the death of many Chinese people, the policies
passed after the massacre provide some evidence of the VOC returning to older approaches of
governing the Batavian Chinese but also of adopting significantly more restrictive policies to
segregate even wealthy Chinese merchants from Europeans. Undoubtedly, relations between the
groups had changed after the massacre since trust had diminished. While thousands of Chinese
lived inside the city walls before the massacre, this arrangement was quickly altered. The act
passed on November 11, 1740 banned the Chinese from living within the walled city of Batavia
and from being within the city walls after six pm. Additionally, the policy prohibited the
shipping of goods in the city to Chinese, Gentiles, and Muslims.279 Realizing that the massacre
changed the relationship between Europeans and Chinese, the Company decided it was best to
live in separate areas of the city, which is something other European powers, such as the Spanish
in the Philippines, had orchestrated from the beginning of their establishment in Asia. This was a
new practice for the Dutch, and it was not instituted until after the massacre. The new policy
passed on March 3, 1741 sanctioned an area south of Batavia to be the new Chinese
settlement.280 This distrust is also evident in the other policy passed on the same date that banned
the Chinese in Batavia from allowing more than two people to stay the night in the arak
distilleries.281 The Company was suspicious of Chinese people congregating together in large
groups, so the Chinese were instructed to report back to the Chinese settlement at night. These
policies were certainly restrictive and repressive. However, the VOC did not continue to use
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violence in response to these Chinese inhabitants. Instead, the policies reflect an attempt to
restore some of the trading relationship the Dutch had with the wealthy merchant Chinese.
Nonetheless, the VOC continued to closely monitor the Chinese in Batavia. By October
12 certain suspicious Chinese in Batavia had two weeks to turn in any weapons they owned, and
it was forbidden for anyone to sell new weapons to these same citizens.282 This was a similar
policy to the one passed shortly before the massacre occurred. The VOC’s ongoing fear of
Chinese uprisings sparked these policies. This is not surprising considering the thousands of
Chinese rebels who were conspiring against the VOC in other parts of Java. On the same day the
Company prohibited for the Chinese to enter the city of Batavia, even under the guidance of
Europeans.283 They were only permitted to do so if they received a special permit from the
Governor-General or another high-ranking official of the Company. It was difficult to restore the
relationship of the past century that had existed between these two groups, and restoring trust
would take time. Though the Dutch sources do not shed light on the opinions or fears of the
Chinese in Batavia after the massacre, one can only assume that they were consumed with even
more distrust and fear than the Europeans. Chinese economic interactions and dependence on the
Company certainly changed. However, over time, the economic relationship between the Dutch
and the Chinese did improve. In 1742 the VOC provided an official office to the appointed
Chinese captain, where he could organize and preserve all official documents and hold formal
weekly meetings.284 Hence, the Company restored and further improved the authority and role of
the Chinese Council, and it controlled its own archive of all Chinese activities in Batavia.
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Chinese merchants were also permitted to enter Batavia again, and some remnants of the
lucrative partnership were eventually restored between the two groups.
The massacre changed the policies that related to the Chinese. Though these restrictive
policies were burdensome to the Chinese in Batavia, they were not violent in nature. The
Chinese who were granted amnesty by the VOC were still considered “partners” to the
Europeans. Though neither group could return to the more peaceful time before the massacre,
they nonetheless discovered ways to return to their mutually profitable partnership. The major
policy change, however, is evident in the way the VOC responded to the rebels outside the city
during the period of wartime that followed. As is characteristic during times of war, the VOC
used violent armed forces to combat the rebel Chinese and Javanese; however, this violence was
not extended to the Chinese merchants in Batavia. Though the Dutch refrained from overtly
coercive policies of control in Batavia in order to reestablish the trading partnership, the full
scale war between the Chinese, Javanese, and the VOC changed how the Company treated
Chinese rebels. The violence used by the Dutch against their opponents during wartime does not
reflect or represent the philosophical approach the Company had toward the Chinese people in
Batavia for over a century.
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION
Since the VOC established its headquarters at Batavia in 1619, its policies toward the
Chinese population in the city had been one of economic cooperation. The members of the VOC
realized that the Chinese were advantageous because of the lucrative trading network that they
had built which linked Java to other parts of East Asia, and they passed policies for over a
century that reflected this essential need for collaboration. The Chinese massacre of 1740 was
completely out of line with these long-term policies. The massacre should not be considered as
part of the pattern of Dutch colonial violence; instead, it should be considered on its own because
of the century-long period of peaceful collaboration that preceded the event.

Unique Situations leading up to the Massacre
Several factors disrupted the institutionalized modus operandi of the Dutch in their
relationship with the Batavian Chinese. Conditions in the Ommelanden became increasingly
dangerous due to unsettled, wandering Chinese laborers. This issue only intensified with the
increasing number of illegal Chinese migrants entering Java, who very quickly became a threat
to everyone in the Ommelanden. People did not feel safe enough to leave their own homes. The
Dutch responded by passing multiple policies that were intended to regulate the illegal Chinese
immigrants and to minimize the dangerous roaming groups they formed. These policies forced
the Chinese to prove their legal citizenship by showing their permission tickets. If they were
unable to do this, they faced deportation to China or to Ceylon.285 Instead of responding
immediately with violence toward the undocumented Chinese and the increasing number of
dangerous Chinese loiterers, the Dutch passed a series of policies that aimed to mitigate, if not
285
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completely eliminate, the danger in the Ommelanden in a way that would not threaten their
profitable trade and partnership with the Chinese merchants resident within Batavia’s city walls.
In doing this, the Dutch clearly demonstrated their preference for seeking alternative methods of
control and maintenance of the growing threat of new Chinese migrants and established poor
laborers in place of simply a violent response.
Economic factors as well as corruption were the two other triggers that set off a Dutch
response of violence against the Chinese. The decline in the sugar industry pushed many Chinese
business owners into bankruptcy. The increase in unemployment only worsened the danger and
instability of the Ommelanden. Many historians argue that the taxation by the Dutch was a
repressive measure to cripple the Chinese since they were burdened by many tolls and
extortions.286 Though taxation of the Chinese in Batavia was heavy and burdensome at times,
taxation was an alternative measure to violence. Taxation proved sovereignty of power and
provided the income needed to maintain its armed forces in the colony. For these purposes, the
VOC was able to maintain control over the Chinese inhabitants without causing them physical
harm. While other colonial powers, such as the Spanish in the Philippines, conducted mass
killings to control large Chinese populations, the Dutch selected a more peaceful method of
control.287 Moreover, there is evidence that at least some Chinese merchants did not consider
Dutch taxation as exorbitantly harsh, but that there were even some benefits attached to the
taxation that other ethnic people did not receive. While taxes were onerous on average Chinese
laborers, merchants found them less burdensome.288 Taxation of the Chinese had been a policy of
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the VOC since the establishment of Batavia in 1620.289 Taxation did not become an economic
issue or burden to the Chinese until after the 1720s when the sugar industry declined, directly
impacting the Ommelanden.
This issue was worsened further by corruption in the surrounding area, where bribes were
commonplace. The influx of Chinese laborers only increased the corruption. Nachodas, or
commanders of Chinese junks, felt pressured by various policies of the VOC that regulated
Chinese immigrants. Consequently, the nachodas bribed port officials who had connections with
sugar mill operators.290 This vicious cycle of corruption spiraled out of control. The kapitein was
completely undermined because illegal Chinese workers often bribed the sheriffs to avoid being
denounced.291 Long-term cooperation was destroyed due to this ongoing large-scale corruption.
Even the Chinese captain participated in this fraudulent behavior. Some Chinese merchants came
to greatly resent kapitein Ni Hoe-kong, including the anonymous author of the Chinese Annals.
In addition to his dishonesty, he showed no compassion for the Chinese who were bankrupt and
burdened by taxation. It is due to these factors that at least some of the Chinese elite blamed Ni
Hoe-kong for the disasters of the massacre, creating a suitable scapegoat. Even in regard to the
taxation of permits for illegal Chinese laborers, the Annals reveal that some of the Chinese
believed that the kapitein could have prevented the conflict entirely if he had merely paid for the
permits.292 They believed that much of the violence would have been avoided if the Chinese
captain had been a noble and compassionate leader. However, such a simplistic explanation of
the massacre does not do justice to the intricate and interwoven elements that actually led to the
deadly event. There were many people and circumstances to blame for the massacre.
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Additionally, due to a lack of communication between the corrupt officials in the Ommelanden
and the more stable authorities in Batavia, many of the people in Batavia were unaware of the
issues of the surrounding area. They did not know of the lack of authority that the Chinese
captain held or the self-indulgent behavior of lieutenants and sheriffs.293 As a result, this
corruption deteriorated every foundation for trust in the Ommelanden.

The Massacre as an Anomaly
The Chinese massacre of 1740 was not just another episode of violence in the broader
pattern of colonial brutality. This event should not be aggregated with other acts of European
violence or Dutch brutality, such as the violence in the Banda islands. Dutch policy toward the
Chinese merchants differed from other indigenous groups because the Dutch and the Chinese
merchants benefited mutually from each other. The Dutch trading company needed the Chinese
merchants to profit from the internal Asian trade routes, and cooperation was essential for this
partnership to be successful. Since the Dutch did not consider the Chinese merchants as equals,
the VOC instituted policies, such as registration and poll taxes, that asserted their authority, but
they refrained from violent policies that would threaten the trade. The Dutch Company was
successful in upholding this collaborative environment for over one hundred and twenty-one
years. Due to this unique environment, the massacre that occurred was an anomaly for the Dutch
policy at Batavia. Violence toward the Chinese merchants in Batavia was not tolerated by the
Heeren XVII, which was demonstrated by the arrest of Governor Valckenier. Even in the war
that ensued in Java after the massacre, there were still efforts made to maintain a mutuallybeneficial environment between the VOC and the Batavian merchant Chinese. The VOC and the
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Chinese merchants did eventually return to a mutually-beneficial trading relationship similar to
the one they enjoyed before the violent event broke out.
This thesis contributes to the larger field of colonial studies because it has shown that
while the Dutch regularly used violence to advance their interests, not all Dutch violence was the
same and should not be considered as one. Far from advancing VOC interests, the violence
against Chinese merchants in Batavia ran counter to VOC policy and harmed their trading
operation. Thus, context is vital, and violent acts must be considered in context. The massacre of
1740 followed an unusually extended time of cooperation and peace between Chinese merchants
and the VOC. This thesis emphasized the need to study the massacre within this important
context. This study encourages similar studies in colonial violence, such as the treatment of
indigenous peoples in places controlled by other European powers.
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